THREE ESSAYS ON BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS by E. Shakina
Three Essays on Behavioural 
Economics 
 
 
 
 
submitted in fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy in Economics 
 
 
 
 
Ekaterina Shakina 
 
Research Supervisor: Prof. Antonio 
Filippin 
 
 
 
 
PhD Program in Economics - Universities 
of Milan and Pavia 
 
 
 
 
October 2018 
ii  
 
 
 
Contents 
1 Introduction iii 
2 Chapter I: Bank runs as a coordination problem within a two     1   
banks set-up: who will survive?  
3 Chapter II: Coordination and communication during bank runs 53 
4 Chapter III: Income uncertainty and retirement savings in         101 
different pension systems: An experimental study 
Introduction
The current PhD dissertation is the collection of three research articles in experimental
economics. The focus of two of them is the problem of bank runs. The first paper is an
experiment based on the extension of a well - known theoretical model of Diamond and
Dybvig. The second paper is based on an alternative approach to the problem of bank
runs, such that experimental subjects are less restricted by the theoretical assumptions
and are given more freedom to behave as they do in real life. The third article is a
preliminary version of the working paper that is devoted to the question of insufficient
pension savings and the how pension system design may stimulate people to save more.
The first paper presents an extended version of the Diamond and Dybvig model in which
depositors of one bank besides keeping and withdrawing are given an option to redeposit
the money from one bank to the other. Most of the theoretical, empirical and experimental
literature on bank runs considers the decision of a depositor to keep or to withdraw the
money within the framework of one bank. Whereas in real life people are surrounded
by many banking institutions, so always have a choice among them. In case of doubts
regarding the financial stability of their bank, depositors may relocate the deposit from
their bank to another one. The availability of such a choice may have a twofold effect.
On one hand, it gives depositors freedom to choose a bank that they consider financially
stable, thus it should lead to less banking panics. On the other hand, depositors may get
less loyal and in case of any doubts change their initial deposit allocation.
The first paper is aimed to analyse whether depositors who are provided with a choice
among banks actually use such an option. Specifically, whether they tend to relocate
deposits instead of simply withdrawing the money. It may seem unimportant from the
perspective of a specific bank what does a depositor do with the withdrawn amount - keeps
it in cash or relocates it to another bank. However, it is crucial from the macroeconomic
point of view. In case the money is kept "under the pillow", it stays outside of the
banking system, whereas being redeposited it continues to be lent to other individuals
or enterprises; thus, stimulates economic activity. For all these reasons, I consider the
research focus of the first paper important for understanding the phenomenon of bank
runs.
Overall, I find theoretically and later support it experimentally, that when a redepositing
option is available, the number of simultaneous bank runs decreases compared with the
case when depositors cannot relocate their deposits. At the same time, the frequency
of bank runs becomes highly disproportional across banks and the number of individual
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bankruptcies increases. Apart from that, I find that individual characteristics of deposi-
tors play an important role. Risk averse subject tend to withdraw more compared to risk
neutral and risk seeking depositors. Also, if a depositor has experienced a bank run in
the past, it will increase the chances that he will not keep his money in the bank in the
future.
The second paper is aimed to analyze the withdrawal behavior of banks’ depositors in
times of economic crisis. The set-up of the model differs from the classical framework
of Diamond and Dybvig (1983): subjects are not restricted by the number of times they
can withdraw or keep the money back. Additionally, there is no specific order in which
subjects decide. Also, the amount which can be withdrawn or kept back to the bank is
defined by the subject and not by experimenters. In addition, it is assumed that a certain
part of a deposit is covered by the deposit insurance, which allows to define the panic
as a situation in which a depositor withdraws even the amount covered by the deposit
insurance.
As it is difficult to find the theoretically optimal behavior in such a complicated game, its
solution is reached using the mathematical simulation. Later, the results of the experiment
are compared with the results of the simulation. There are two versions of the experiment
conducted. In the first version, there is no possibility of interaction between the subjects,
whereas in the second version subjects can communicate via the chat box which is always
available on the computer screen. Experimental subjects are not limited by the number
of messages they can send. Besides that, they can communicate with any of the players.
Overall, the experiment seeks to analyze the influence of several factors, such as the
possibility to communicate, the culture of subjects, deposit insurance and the liquidity
of the bank on the withdrawal behavior. It is found that communication helps to stop
bank runs, whereas information about the worsening of economic conditions together
with irrational behavior increase the incidence of withdrawals. Also, not only the fact
of communication, but also its mood plays an essential role. Sometimes subjects wrote
positive messages reassuring others the bank is financially stable, other times the message
could contain an expectation that the bank run is about to happen. Overall, by sorting
out all the messages as negative, neutral and positive, it has been found that the mood of
communication is sensitive to changes in economic conditions and was a possible signal
of upcoming withdrawals. Once the ratio of positive to negative messages approaches
one, withdrawals increase sharply. Besides that, the results show that personal features
of subjects influence their withdrawal behaviour. There is some evidence that women
withdraw more quickly as well as irrationally but in smaller amounts, while men tend to
wait to make a decision but then withdraw more at one time. Besides that, it was found
that Russians withdraw more money but less often than Germans.
The third paper is the preliminary draft of a working paper. It is devoted to the anal-
ysis of people’s saving decisions across different pension systems and income profiles.
The problem of insufficient savings for retirement is acute for the majority of countries.
However, it is still not completely clear, which factors influence saving choices and what
makes people to save more for the retirement. To answer these questions, we conducted
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an experiment in which subjects were presented with different saving alternatives, that
theoretically should not influence the saved amount.
There are six experimental treatments that vary in two dimensions. First, in half of the
sessions the income that the subjects can spend and save for the future, is constant and
known, whereas in other half of the sessions it is stochastic, thus unknown. The second
dimension of comparison is the type of pension system. The first pension system has
no particular mechanism that would oblige people to save. Everything that is not spent
on consumption becomes "pocket" savings, which can be used by the subjects at any
moment in time. In a pension system of the second type, people are obliged to save
a certain fraction of their income in every working period. The total obligatory saved
amount cannot be spent until the retirement phase starts. Besides obligatory savings,
people can still make additional pocket savings. The third pension system provides an
additional option: voluntary pension savings. The difference between voluntary pension
savings and pocket savings is that voluntary savings can be accessed before retirement.
Overall, it has been observed that voluntary saving option made subjects to save more.
There is no evidence that obligatory contributions and stochasticity of income motivates
people to make larger savings. In addition, experimental results show that better cognitive
abilities lead to better performance in the saving task.
Regardless the difference in topics of all three papers, the conclusions reached in each of
them are based on the experimental results. Thus, the experiment is used as one of the
main tools of the research in all three works. The remainder of the thesis is structured as
the collection of three papers presented in the order stated above. The appendixes and
the relevant list of references are placed at the end of each of the papers for the matter
of convenience.
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Bank runs as a coordination problem within a two
banks set-up: who will survive?∗
Ekaterina Shakina†
Abstract
The paper presents an extended version of the Diamond and Dybvig model,
where depositors of one bank besides keeping and withdrawing are given an option to
redeposit the money to another bank. I find that the frequency of bank runs becomes
disproportional: being given an opportunity to choose among banks, depositors
tend to relocate deposits leaving their bank more often, which keeps clients of a
recipient bank calm. The number of simultaneous bank runs decreases although
insignificantly. The most commonly played equilibrium is when all the subjects
keep the money in the corresponding bank. Besides that, in the treatment with the
redepositing option, subjects actively use it under the condition that the subjects
of the bank-recipient keep the money. Subjects learn how to coordinate and play
equilibria more frequently in the second than in the first half of the game. Also, the
history of previous experiences matter: the more runs a subject has witnessed, the
less he keeps the money in the bank in the future.
Keywords: bank runs, experiment, coordination problem
JEL classification: C92, C79, G41
∗Financial support by the University of Milan is gratefully acknowledged.
†University of Milan, via Conservatorio 7, 20122 Milan, Italy; Email: ekaterina.shakina@unimi.it
1
1 Introduction
The first bank run documented in the literature happened in the 16th century in England,
causing economic damages to the country. Since then, bank runs tend to occur with a
persistent regularity having severe consequences for the economies all over the world
(Kindleberger, 2015; Laeven and Valencia, 2013). Several factors influence the emergence
as well as the propagation of bank runs. Among them are the level of deposit insurance
(Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009), Boyle et al. (2015), Madies (2006)), availability of
information and its completeness (Arifovic and Jiang (2014), Schotter and Yorulmazer
(2009)) as well as personal characteristics of depositors (Kelly and Gráda (2000), Iyer
and Puri (2012)).
In the current paper, I investigate another factor that is important for bank runs prop-
agation, although has not been considered in the literature. I analyze how the existence
of several (two) banks together with a possibility to relocate a deposit from one bank to
another at no cost may change the withdrawal behavior of subjects. To my knowledge,
in none of the theoretical and experimental studies on bank runs, a subject is given a
possibility to change the initial deposit allocation. However, there is some empirical ev-
idence that the option to leave one bank for another may be crucial for the stability of
the banking system, especially on the moments of panics.
Saunders and Wilson (1996) analyze the behavior of depositors in the US in 1929-1933
and find that depositors were not withdrawing but reallocating the money to other banks
which seemed to be solvent. The recent empirical study by Brown et al. (2014) shows
that almost 80% of households that withdrew their deposits from a distressed swiss bank
(UBS), redeposited the money to another non-distressed one. According to Iyer and
Puri (2012), depositors were likely to redeposit funds with government banks in case of
panics. Schumacher (2000) shows that during the currency crisis in Argentina, depositors
relocated the money from banks that were not likely to survive the crisis to more resilient
banks. Thus, whether a depositor has a choice among banks or not may be crucial for
the withdrawal behavior as well as for emergency and propagation of bank runs.
Furthermore, understanding whether depositors withdraw or redeposit is essential for
the regulators of a banking sector, because these two actions have a different effect on
the banking system’s liquidity. Withdrawals cause a contraction in the money supply
(Friedman and Schwartz (2008), Kaufman (1994)) and slow down the aggregate economic
activity (Mishkin (1992)). Whereas if a client redeposits, the money still stays in the
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banking system thus does not lead to the liquidity shortage. In other words, the same
action of withdrawal may have different consequences for the banking system with only
one bank and several banks. In the first case, the bank run means the collapse of the entire
banking system. Whereas in the latter case, if all subjects leave one bank for another,
there is one severe bank run, although the banking system still preserves the overall level
of liquidity. Introduction of a model with more than one bank, as well as the possibility
to redeposit, may be a good starting point to understand what may keep the money of
depositors within the banking system which is vital in times of economic turbulence.
Overall, the paper seeks to answer two main research questions: (1) How does the in-
troduction of a costless redepositing option changes withdrawal behavior as well as the
propensity of an individual bank to fail?; (2) When subjects can relocate their deposits,
do simultaneous bank runs occur more/less often?
To answer these questions, I develop an extended version of the Diamond and Dybvig
(DD) model. I consider two banks such that depositors of one of the banks can relocate
money to another bank at no cost. I assume that banks have the same fundamentals to
exclude the possibility of one bank being initially “healthier” than another. There is no
guarantee that a subject will not experience a bank run changing initial bank allocation.
However, due to the fact that new clients may join one of the banks, it may be perceived as
more stable in the eyes of depositors. The banks have the same number of initial clients,
the same fundamentals and provide the same interest rates on deposits - the banks do
not compete for clients setting different interest rates. Hence, there are no monetary
incentives, only the availability of choice among banks that may influence the depositors’
behaviour.
To understand whether the introduction of an option to relocate a deposit leads to more
bank runs, I find theoretically optimal behavior in the extended model and compare it
with the one in the classical model without redepositing. Then I check my conclusions
experimentally by running two versions of the game: with and without a redepositing
option. I construct the experiment in the form of a game that is being played 20 times.
I apply a fixed matching of subjects, which allows me to study learning effects and to
see how withdrawal behavior changes across time1. According to the literature, there is
no consensus reached regarding this topic. Arifovic et al. (2013) do not find any learning
effects, whereas Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) show that subjects do learn over the
game. One may claim that learning effects in bank - run games are not informative per
1 The initial matching of subjects within a bank and a system of two banks stays through the entire
game.
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se as far as people go through the bank run situation at most ones in their lives (Schotter
and Yorulmazer (2009)). However, retail bank customers rarely change their main bank
relationship (Kiser (2002)), which means that they are dealing with the same bank for
most of the time. In this case, learning effects can be useful for explaining the changes in
the withdrawal behavior of individuals even if no bank runs occur.
I find that the costless possibility to change initial deposit allocation has a twofold effect
on bank runs. On the one hand, provided with a redepositing option, depositors tend
to leave their bank more often than when such an option is not available. On the other
hand, the bank which receives new clients experiences fewer runs. Overall, in a banking
system where subjects can relocate their deposits, there are more cases of at least one
bank run happening, and insignificantly less simultaneous bank runs. In both treatments,
I observe better coordination in the second half of the game than in the first one. Besides
that, risk averse subjects are more reluctant to keep money in a bank than risk neutral
and risk seeking individuals.2 I find that negative experience of going through a bank
run leads to more cases of subjects leaving the bank in the future. Thus, bank runs are
contaminating: if they happened in the past, it increases the chance of them occurring
again later.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First, I analyze the main literature on
the topic. Then, I describe the Diamond and Dybvig model and the proposed theoretical
extension. Next, I provide a numerical simulation which is used for the experiment as
well as state the main hypotheses. Finally, I analyze the data and conclude.
2 Literature
There is an immense number of theoretical, empirical and experimental literature on the
topic of bank runs. Usually the object of studies is either a bank run (Arifovic and Jiang
(2014), Madies (2006), Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009)) or a banking panic (Chakravarty
et al. (2014), Brown et al. (2016), Duffy et al. (2016)). The main difference between these
two notions is that a bank run happens in one bank whereas a banking panic overwhelms
many banks. Studies on individual bank failures usually assume the existence of only one
bank in the banking system. As far as I consider deposit movements across banks, I focus
mainly on research works that model (or can be easily applied to) several banks operating
within the banking system.
2 I use the same notions of different risk attitudes (risk aversion, risk loving and risk neutrality) as
Crosetto and Filippin (2013).
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2.1 Theoretical Literature
The problem of bank runs has been considered in the theoretical literature from different
angles. Bryant (1980) introduces an overlapping-generations model in which people can
borrow from banks to finance their consumption. He shows that demand deposits backed
by fractional currency reserves and public insurance can be beneficial to prevent bank
runs. Temzelides (1997) analyzes whether the average size of a bank in the system affects
the panic propagation. The author introduces several banks of equal size, assuming
that the number of its clients defines the size of a bank. All people know the size of
the representative bank in the system, but do not know how big is the bank where
they keep a deposit. Temzelides (1997) shows that clients panic more the smaller is the
representative bank. Besides that, the local interaction between clients triggers bank runs
in the neighboring banks.
As Temzelides (1997), Allen and Gale (2000) investigate how contagion can spread among
banks. Subjects are assigned to one of the banks that hold interregional claims on each
other. In case there are too many withdrawals from one of the banks, another bank lends
its funds which are the money of its depositors. The authors show that financial linkages
of this kind can turn out to be a disaster: in the end, interbank relations can lead to an
economy-wide financial crisis.
Iori et al. (2006) analyze how heterogeneity in average liquidity of banks influences
bankruptcies. They find that in a system with heterogeneous banks the risks of con-
tagion are higher. Also, Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008), Acharya (2009) claim that in
such a banking system, financial institutions have an incentive to make similar invest-
ments, which in the end undermines the financial stability of the financial system as a
whole.
Freixas et al. (2011) consider that bank panics may happen if the interbank market rate
is not set correctly. If it is too high, it may be not enough liquidity in the interbank
market as banks will be obliged to pay high returns to the clients. As a consequence, it
may lead to massive failures to meet obligations in front of the depositors and cause bank
runs. Zhu (2005) proposes a model in which bank runs are closely related to the state of
the business cycle. He finds that interest-cap deposit insurance scheme can prevent bank
runs, although he admits that the model misses essential features such as information
asymmetry among agents and idiosyncratic shocks faced by banks.
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) show that not only overall economic conditions and in-
terbank relations but also the conditions of a deposit contract affect the occurrence of
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bank runs. The authors find that banks become more vulnerable when they offer more
risk sharing. Cañón and Margaretic (2014) extend the model of Goldstein and Pauzner
(2005) by showing that the introduction of reserve requirements by a central bank can
decrease the probability of a bank run.
Wang (2013) contributes to the existing literature by analyzing how the announcement
of bailouts affects depositors’ behavior. The author finds that availability of the bailout
policy helps to prevent clients from leaving the bank, however, when it is announced that
there will be a bailout, clients immediately run on the bank. The role of information has
also been studied by He and Manela (2016). The authors are interested to know how
availability and precision of signals about bank’s solvency effects the propagation of bank
runs. They find that less informative signals make subjects wait to withdraw, whereas
private information acquisition shortens the survival time of illiquid banks.
2.2 Empirical Literature
Empirical studies on bank runs are scarce (Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000)). The main
research works are by Kelly and Gráda (2000), Gráda and White (2003), Iyer and Puri
(2012), Ramirez and Zandbergen (2014), Ziebarth (2013), Saunders and Wilson (1996).
Kelly and Gráda (2000), Gráda and White (2003) investigate whether there is any link
between social knits and a banking contagion. Considering the panics of 1854 and 1857
in the United States, they analyze the behavior of Irish immigrants living in New York in
the 1850’s. The authors find that immigrants who were originally from the same province
of Ireland were panicking together provoking bank runs. Besides that, the authors study
whether the banking crises of 1854 and 1857 were caused by bad banks’ fundamentals
or massive panics. They claim that both crises were not driven by the immediate panic.
Also, the panic of 1857 was an informed contagion as it was caused by business leaders
and banking clerks and only then was supported by withdrawals of less educated and less
informed clients.
Whether bank runs are the result of bad economic conditions or panicking behavior is
additionally investigated by Ramirez and Zandbergen (2014) and Saunders and Wilson
(1996). Ramirez and Zandbergen (2014) consider the banking crisis that happened in the
United States in 1893. They are interested in analyzing deposit withdrawals from four
national banks that operated in Helena and Montana. The authors find that the runs
are driven by panic, not by bad bank fundamentals. Also, there is a strong correlation
between withdrawals which proves the existence of contagion. The authors claim that
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bank runs in Helena and Montana are an excellent example of how depositors’ behavior
can trigger a massive banking panic. Saunders and Wilson (1996) analyze bank runs that
happened during the Great Depression. The authors find the evidence of contagion for
1930–1932, while none seems to have existed in 1929 or 1933.
As far as information plays a vital role in the propagation of bank runs, Ziebarth (2013)
investigate the influence of media on their severity. The author tests whether radio pen-
etration rates correlate with the levels of banking stress during the period of the Great
Depression. Finally, he finds that 10% increase in radio penetration rates caused a 4.3
percentage drop in the number of bank deposits between 1930 and 1933. It proves that
information translated by the media can affect the behavior of depositors during bank
runs.
2.3 Experimental Literature
Individual bank runs have been extensively researched over the last years (Arifovic and
Jiang (2014), Garratt and Keister (2009), Kiss et al. (2014), Madies (2006)), whereas
experimental literature on banking panics is scarce. According to my knowledge, there
are only 3 experimental studies by Chakravarty et al. (2014), Brown et al. (2014) and
Duffy et al. (2016) in which banks are considered not in isolation, but as a part of one
banking system.
Chakravarty et al. (2014) run an experiment in which two banks (Left and Right) are
functioning within the same banking system. Each bank has 10 depositors. Depositors of
the Left Bank know the level of liquidity in their bank before they make a decision, whereas
Right Bank depositors can guide themselves only knowing the decisions of the Left Bank
depositors and the liquidity level of the Right Bank in the previous period. Depositors
of the same bank make their decisions simultaneously. The authors are interested in
analyzing whether the decisions of the Left Bank depositors influence withdrawal behavior
of the Right Bank depositors. They show experimentally that this influence is present
both when banks’ liquidity levels are assumed to follow independent Markov processes
and when they are identical. Thus, the authors cannot conclude that the runs are caused
only by the fundamentals of the bank (the level of liquidity). Indeed, bank runs are also
triggered by the pure panic of players.
A similar experiment is conducted by Brown et al. (2014). The authors consider a banking
system with two banks. Each bank has two depositors. The pair of participants assigned
to the first bank is called “Leaders”, whereas the depositors of the second bank are named
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“Followers”. Depositors from the same pair simultaneously decide whether to keep or to
withdraw a deposit. “Leaders” know the quality of their bank assets, which can be weak
or strong with the same probability, whereas “Followers” are uncertain about their bank
assets’ quality. Each subject in a couple of “Followers” decide after “Leaders” have made
their choices.
There are three experimental treatments. In the first treatment (the No-Linkages treat-
ment) the number of withdrawals that occurred in the leaders’ bank is communicated
to the followers and becomes common knowledge. The followers are informed that the
leaders knew the asset quality of their bank before they made their decisions and that the
realization of the actual asset quality of their bank is independent of that of the leaders’
bank. In the second treatment (the Linkages treatment) followers are informed that the
asset quality of their bank is identical to that of the leaders’ bank they observe, whereas
all other features of the first and the second treatments are identical. In the third treat-
ment (the Baseline treatment) the followers are not informed about the behavior of the
leaders. As in the other two treatments, followers are uncertain about the asset quality
of their bank. The third treatment serves as a benchmark for two others.
Brown et al. (2014) analyze whether deposit withdrawals are highly contagious across
banks when depositors know (do not know) that there are or there are no economic
linkages between banks. The authors show that the contagion is likely in linkage games
but only when the players know that the link exists. Both Chakravarty et al. (2014) and
Brown et al. (2014) assume that depositors have no choice among banks: subjects are
assigned to one of the banks by the experimenters and can either keep or withdraw the
money. Thus, players cannot change their initial bank allocation. The main difference
between two experiments is that Brown et al. (2014) measure explicitly the beliefs of
depositors in the followers’ by using the baseline treatment, which is absent in the work
of Chakravarty et al. (2014).
Compared to Brown et al. (2014) and Chakravarty et al. (2014), Duffy et al. (2016) con-
sider a larger network of banks. They assume the existence of four banks in the network
that may have four possible symmetric structures. According to the first structure, banks
do not have any linkages. Regarding the second one, banks are connected pairwise. In
the third structure, the connection is incomplete: every bank is related only with two
other banks, whereas, in the complete structure (the fourth one), all banks are linked.
Duffy et al. (2016) find that financial contagions are possible both in incomplete and com-
plete network structures, but they are significantly less likely to occur under a complete
interbank network structure. It happens because complete interbank network structures
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facilitate more efficient risk sharing among banks.
2.4 Summary
There is a variety of theoretical, empirical and experimental literature devoted to the
analysis of withdrawal behavior during bank runs. However, in all the studies subjects
can either keep or withdraw the money from a bank; there is no possibility to relocate the
deposit from one bank to another (Temzelides (1997), Allen and Gale (2000), Acharya
and Yorulmazer (2008), Chakravarty et al. (2014), Brown et al. (2014), etc.). Such an
assumption limits the number of available options for subjects and distorts the overall
picture, as far as in reality people can and do choose among banks (Saunders and Wilson
(1996), Iyer and Puri (2012)).
Because the model where subjects can change their initial deposit allocation is empirically
motivated and theoretically appealing (He and Manela (2016)), I propose a theoretical
model with two banks such that clients of one of the banks can redeposit the money to
another bank. As far as most of the theoretical and experimental literature is based on
the model of Diamond & Dybvig (Green and Lin (2003), Cavalcanti (2010), Gu (2011),
Cañón and Margaretic (2014)), I use it as the baseline for my experiment.
The DD model is constructed as a game in which depositors must decide whether to keep
or to withdraw the money from a bank.3 If too many subjects decide to withdraw, a
bank may not be able to pay to all of them thus goes bankrupt. The bank is assumed
to be financially stable by default; thus the model considers bank runs as a consequence
of a panic not related to the bank’s fundamentals.4 I extend the model of DD for the
two banks’ case. To avoid a situation when a healthier bank attracts a weaker bank’s
depositors (Kaufman (1994), Diamond and Rajan (2012), Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2006)),
I assume that two banks are identical with regard to their fundamentals. Consequently,
depositors’ decisions are influenced only by information about other clients’ withdrawals
and are not affected by banks’ fundamentals. It allows me to preserve the original idea
of the DD model that bank runs are the result of a pure coordination game.
The extension of the DD model that I suggest contributes to the existing literature in sev-
3 Here I provide only the intuition behind the model leaving all the details for the theoretical framework
section.
4 Some authors claim that depositors’ beliefs about the bank’s fundamentals play an important role in
bank runs (Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Calomiris and Mason (2003)). I acknowledge this point
of view and think that the introduction of fundamentals’ heterogeneity could be a promising extension
of my model. For more details see "Conclusions and discussion" section.
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eral ways. First, it replicates the functioning of a banking system more realistically as far
as depositors are allowed to change the bank. Second, it is built on the widely-accepted
theoretical model, which makes possible comparability of the current and previous re-
search results. Lat but not least, it seeks to check whether theoretically found optimal
behavior (Nash equilibria) for the two banks’ case is observed in the experiment.5
All the details regarding the model are provided in the following section. To make it
easier to follow, I start with the DD model and then introduce its extension with two
banks where players of one of the banks can redeposit the money to another. After that,
I provide numerical examples for both versions of the model and find Nash equilibria.
Lastly, I elaborate on how the option to redeposit should influence the optimal decision-
making of people and consequently change a possibility of bank runs to happen.
3 Theoretical framework
3.1 Diamond and Dybvig model
Consider a game with a single bank and several depositors. The bank invests in a long-
term project using deposited amounts. Deposits are of the same maturity as the invest-
ment project. However, the depositors may withdraw the money earlier - before the due
date. The bank knows how many "early" withdrawals may happen and sets the deposit
interest rate accordingly. If due to the panic more depositors withdraw too early, the
bank goes bankrupt. Thus, the model explains bank runs as a consequence of excessive
withdrawals driven by the pure panic of depositors.
Bank
The time is discrete: T=0,1,2. At T=0, the bank collects money in the form of deposits
that mature at T=2.6 To be able to pay interest on deposits the bank invests all the funds
in a project which at T=2 gives a return of R>1 per unit invested. Although deposits are
due in two periods, depositors may withdraw the money earlier - at T=1. In this case,
the bank has to take out some part of its investment at a salvage value of 1, because the
5 In this regard, it contributes to the studies of Madies (2006) and Garratt and Keister (2009) who
analyze the frequency of equilibria. I add to these conclusions analyzing corresponding frequencies for
the two banks’ case.
6 The original model assumes the infinite number of depositors, but it can be applied to the case when
their number is finite. Please, see Section 3.3.
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project is interrupted and the money withdrawn earns no interest. Depositors who always
withdraw at T=1 are called "impatient". An impatient depositor always withdraws at
T=1, because consumption at T=2 gives him no utility (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)),
whereas a patient depositor may withdraw at T=1 or at T=2 because he consumes at
T=2.7
Based on the known fraction of impatient depositors (t) and assuming that they are
utility-maximizers, the bank derives the optimal level of interest rates r∗1 and r∗2 to be
paid to the depositors withdrawing at T=1 and T=2 respectively:8
U
max
r1,r2
= t× U (r1)+ (1− t)× U (r2)
t× r1 + (1− t)× r2 × 1R = 1
(1)
It may be proved that 1 < r∗1 < r∗2 < R (see Appendix I). Thus, there are monetary
incentives for patient depositors to keep the money for two periods instead of withdrawing
it "early" (at T=1). If only impatient depositors withdraw, the return on the project is
just enough to pay r∗1 and r∗2 to impatient and patient depositors correspondingly. The
main target of a bank is to meet its obligations in front of depositors who are assumed to
be the owners of a bank.
Depositors
The objective of depositors is to maximize utility that they get from consumption. De-
positors spend everything they earn, so how much they consume, depends on how much
interest they earn on deposits. They learn their types (patient or impatient) at T=1.
Impatient depositors always choose to withdraw early, whereas patient ones decide on the
moment (T=1) whether to withdraw or to keep the funds deposited. The game is simul-
taneous thus expectations of the behavior of others drive the decision of each one. If a
patient depositor expects others to withdraw, it may become optimal for him to withdraw
as well for the reason explained below.
As shown before, the bank sets the optimal interest rates such that only impatient de-
positors should withdraw. However, if there is a panic and not only impatient but also
7 The model assumes no discounting. The same assumption is applied in the experimental literature
(Brown et al. (2012), Kiss et al. (2014), Chakravarty et al. (2014))
8 According to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) utility function should be twice continuously differentiable,
increasing, strictly concave (players are risk averse) and should satisfy the Inada conditions. The
coefficient of relative risk aversion should always be greater than 1.
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some patient depositors decide to withdraw, the bank will not be able to pay off to all,
but only to a fraction of them. In reality, a depositor gets the money in case of a bank
run if he is among the first 1
r∗1
withdrawers in the line. Because the game is simultaneous,
it is defined randomly how many depositors are in front in the line (Fj).
If a depositor withdraws at T=1, he can receive what was promised - r∗1 or nothing (see
Equation 2). The probability of getting r∗1 is defined as the number of depositors that the
bank can pay off divided by the number of depositors that are in a queue to withdraw. If
a depositor keeps the money until T=2, he gets a pro rata share of the bank’s assets at
T=2 (see Equation 3). If there is a massive panic, he will get nothing. On the other hand,
if only impatient depositors withdraw, the patient ones get the highest interest possible:
r∗2. Intrinsically, there is no reason for a patient depositor to withdraw unless he expects
others to do so. In the latter case keeping the money till T=2, he will get nothing with
certainty, whereas withdrawing, he has a chance to get r∗1 even if everyone else withdraws.
To conclude, the depositor’s choice depends on his expectations regarding the actions
of others. If he thinks that massive withdrawals are highly probable, he should also
withdraw; otherwise, he should keep.
V1 =
r∗1, fj < 1r∗10, fj > 1r∗1 (2)
,where V1 - the payoff per unit withdrawn at T=1; fj =
Fj
N
- the fraction of total demand
deposits serviced before agent j
V2 = max (0;
R× (1− f × r∗1)
1− f ) (3)
,where V2 - the payoff per unit kept till T=2, f= FN - the total fraction of withdrawals.
Since the number of early withdrawals is not known with certainty and subjects decide
simultaneously, there are two symmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Which of two
equilibria occurs depends on depositors’ expectations regarding the fraction of those who
will withdraw: f˜
1. When f˜ = t , there is a good equilibrium in which only impatient depositors with-
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draw while patient keep money in a bank.9
2. When f˜ > R−r
∗
1
r∗1×(R−1) , there is a bad equilibrium (a bank run case) when everyone
withdraws the money at T=1.10
3.2 Diamond and Dybvig model with redepositing
The model of DD can be easily extended for a case of two banks functioning independently.
If each of the banks has different depositors and banks don’t have anything in common, we
are still dealing with the DD model, but applied twice. Making one step forward, I modify
the model with two independent banks (Bank I and Bank II) by allowing depositors of
Bank I to relocate money to Bank II.11
Besides using more realistic assumptions, the model with redepositing is important from
a theoretical point of view. Depositors of Bank I are provided with three options (keep,
withdraw and redeposit) instead of two. It gives them an additional incentive to leave
Bank I in case they believe Bank II is safer and worth to redeposit the money there. As
far as money redeposited can be used by Bank II to meet its obligations in case of massive
withdrawals, the bankruptcy of Bank II becomes more difficult to happen compared to
the case when redepositing is not possible.
Overall in a model with redepositing, the subject’s decision depends on his expectations
of what depositors of his as well as of another bank will do, which is not the case when two
banks are functioning independently. Thus the introduction of a possibility to redeposit
changes the complexity of a coordination problem, which makes it interesting to analyze
whether bank runs are more or less likely to occur in this case.
Banks
There are two banks - Bank I and Bank II. Each has the same number of initial (different)
depositors and the same fraction of impatient depositors (t). At T=0, Bank I collects
money in the form of deposits that mature at T=2. To be able to pay interest on deposits,
Bank I invests all the money collected in a long-term project which at T=2 gives a return
9 When f˜ = t the payoffs that are received by depositors coincide with the optimal ones and are the
highest possible for each of the types (patient and impatient) correspondingly. That is why none of the
depositors have an incentive to deviate from the chosen strategy: an impatient one withdraws while a
patient one keeps).
10 For the proof see Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
11 A model may be extended further by allowing depositors of both banks to redeposit, although it is
left for the future research.
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of R>1 per unit invested. As before, in case of many early withdrawals, the bank has to
liquidate some part of its investment at a salvage value of 1 to pay off to the depositors.
Bank II makes an investment in the long-term project (a different one) that gives the same
level of return: R>1. It obtains the funding for it from its initial depositors. Besides that,
Bank II can make an additional investment in the short-term project that lasts from T=1
till T=2 and provides a return – r per unit invested.12 To get money for the short-term
project, Bank II offers an additional deposit contract that lasts from T=1 until T=2. The
contract is aimed at those depositors of Bank I who do not trust the bank and consider
Bank II to be better to keep a deposit there. Thus at T=1 they withdraw the money
from Bank I and bring it to Bank II.
Banks have to define the optimal interest rates to be paid to those who keep (r∗2), withdraw
(r∗1) and redeposit the money (r∗3). I make three assumptions that are important for the
derivation. First, I assume that all the interest earned by Bank II on the short-term
project is equally shared among those who redeposited, that is why r=r3. As far as the
short-term contract does not bring any additional return to the initial depositors of Bank
II, r∗2 and r∗1 stay the same as in the model without a redepositing option, which makes
possible the comparison of the results for two versions of the model.13 Second, in case
of redepositing a subject withdraws a deposit together with interest and relocate all of
it (r∗1) to Bank II. Third, I follow Allen and Gale (1998) and He and Manela (2016), by
assuming that r3 = r2r1 . This assumption is important, because its violation (for instance,
r3 >
r2
r1
) makes by default depositors of Bank I better-off redepositing to Bank II than
keeping money in Bank I. In this case, a decision to redeposit is driven not by sentiments
or beliefs but by objectively better monetary conditions provided by Bank II, which is
not the focus of the current paper. The target is to analyze withdrawal behavior which
is a clear consequence of mis-coordination, which the third assumption allows achieving.
Therefore, it is possible to derive the optimal interest rates as follows:
U
max
r1,r2
= t× U (r1)+ (1− t)× U (r2)
t× r1 + (1− t)× r2 × 1R = 1
r3 =
r2
r1
(4)
12 Following Allen and Gale (2000) and Uhlig (2010), I assume the return on the short-term project to
be higher than one, but less than the return on the long-term project, thus: 1<r<R.
13 This assumption is intuitive and follows the logic of the DD model that a bank earns a zero profit
sharing all its earnings among the owners (depositors).
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Solving the system of equations one can find the optimal interest rates (r∗1, r∗2, r∗3) that are
guaranteed to be paid to the players if in both banks only impatient depositors withdraw.
As it is in the DD model, 1 < r∗1 < r∗2 < R. If only impatient depositors withdraw, a patient
one gets more keeping the money thus there is no reason for him to withdraw. Also there
is no incentive for him to redeposit as the maximum he can get: r∗1× r
∗
2
r∗1
=r∗2 is the same
he would receive keeping the money in Bank I. As far as the game is simultaneous and
the number of early withdrawals is not known with certainty, it may become optimal for
a depositor to withdraw/redeposit instead of keeping if too many depositors are expected
to withdraw. The possibility of such is described below.
Depositors
Bank I
The depositors of Bank I may withdraw, keep or redeposit the money to Bank II. The set
of available actions is common knowledge among all. If a depositor withdraws at T=1 he
can get what was promised - r∗1 or nothing (see Equation 5). The probability of getting r∗1
is defined as the number of withdrawals that the bank can pay off divided by the number
of depositors that claim to withdraw. Depositors who keep the money till T=2, get an
equal share of funds remaining in the bank by that time (see Equation 6). Thus, their
payoff depends on the total number of withdrawals from Bank I, which ranges from 0 to
r∗2.
If a subject decides to redeposit, his payoff depends on: (1) the number of withdrawals
from Bank I; (2) how many depositors withdraw from Bank II. As far as he may get either
r∗1 or 0 withdrawing and then up to r∗3 per unit redeposited, his final payoff varies from 0
to r∗2. In case not only impatient but also patient depositors withdraw from Bank I, one’s
attempt to redeposit may be unsuccessful as he may get nothing to redeposit. Besides
that, the payoff of a depositor to a large extent depends on the number of withdrawals
from Bank II. If only impatient ones withdraw, the subject who redeposits gets what was
promised: r∗1× r∗3 =r∗2. Otherwise, a depositor receives what is left in Bank II at T=2
equally divided among all the depositors who were keeping the money there until that
time. If too many depositors withdraw early, Bank II will use all the funds available
(including those he got from redepositors) to survive. Thus there is a risk that a subject
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who redeposits will get nothing at the end.
V I1 =
r∗1, f Ij < 1r∗10, f Ij > 1r∗1 (5)
,where V I1 - the payoff per unit withdrawn from Bank I at T=1, f Ij - the fraction of total
demand deposits of Bank I serviced before agent j
V I2 = max (0;
R× (1− f I × r∗1)
1− f I ) (6)
,where V I2 - the payoff per unit kept in Bank II till T=2, f I=
F I
N
- the total fraction of
withdrawals from Bank I.
V I3 =

r∗2, t 6 f Ij < 1r∗1 , f
II = t;
(N−F I×r∗1)×R+K×r∗2
N−F II+K , t 6 f
I
j <
1
r∗1
, t < f II 6 1
r∗1
;
max(
(K−(F II×r∗1−N))×r∗2
K+N−F II ; 0), t 6 f
I
j <
1
r∗1
, f II > 1
r∗1
;
0, f Ij > 1r∗1
(7)
,where V I3 - the payoff per unit redeposited; f II =
F II
N
- the total fraction of withdrawals
from Bank II; K - the total number of Bank I depositors who have redeposited the money
to Bank II.
To conclude, what a depositor chooses is dictated by his expectations regarding the actions
of all others. If a depositor believes that his counterpart from Bank I will keep the money,
he should do the same. If he thinks that his counterpart will withdraw, whereas a bank run
for Bank II is unlikely, he should redeposit the money. If he forecasts massive withdrawals
from both banks, the redepositing option is worthless; the best strategy, in this case, is
to withdraw.
Bank II
The depositors of Bank II may withdraw the money at T=1 or keep it till T=2. If a
depositor withdraws at T=1 he can get what was promised - r∗1 or nothing. The amount
that the depositor of Bank II receives if he keeps the funds there depends on the total
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number of withdrawals from the bank as well as on the number of redepositors. The final
payoff of a depositor who keeps varies from 0 to r∗2. As before, the decision is driven by
expectations. If a depositor expects others to withdraw, he should do that as well. As
long as there are some depositors of the first bank relocating the money to the second
bank, Bank II can survive more withdrawals compared with the case when redepositing
is not available. Thus, if redeposits of funds are expected, it may become reasonable for
a player of Bank II to keep even if some of his counterparts withdraw.
V II1 =
r∗1, f IIj <
N+K×r∗1
r∗1×(N+K)
0, f IIj >
N+K×r∗1
r∗1×(N+K)
(8)
,where V II1 - the payoff per unit withdrawn from Bank II at T=1; f IIj =
F IIj
N
- the fraction
of total demand deposits of Bank II serviced before agent j
V II2 =

r∗2, f
II = t
R×(N−F II×r∗1)+K×r∗2
N−F II+K , t < f
II 6 1
r∗1
max(
(K−(F II×r∗1−N))×r∗2
K+N−F II ; 0), f
II > 1
r∗1
(9)
,where V II2 - the payoff per unit kept in Bank II till T=2.
To prove that stated above intuitions are theoretically valid and optimal, I provide a
numerical example for two versions of the model: with and without an option to redeposit.
I find the Nash equilibria for each of the cases and elaborate on the differences observed.
3.3 Numerical Example
Consider a bank that has 3 depositors, out of which 1 is impatient: N=3; t=1/3. From
this point onwards, I consider only patient subjects’ decisions, because an impatient one
always withdraws. Every depositor has 100 ECU as a deposit in the bank.14 The bank
invests in the project that gives a return of R=2.8. Assume that the utility function is
U(C)=C1−ρ
1−ρ , where ρ=3.06.
15 Applying stated above optimality conditions (Equation 1)
the bank sets interest rate: r∗1=1.5; r∗2=2.1. So, if a depositor withdraws the money at
14 ECU stands for experimental currency units
15 The chosen functional form has been widely used in the literature (Temzelides (1997), Ennis and
Keister (2009), Green and Lin (2003))
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T=1, he is promised to receive 150 ECU, while keeping till T=2 brings him 210 ECU.
However, this is guaranteed in case only the impatient depositor withdraws early. Clearly,
the bank can satisfy the maximum of 2 early withdrawals.16
Let’s call patient depositors as Player I and Player II. Each of them may either keep or
withdraw. If none of the patient players withdraws: f=1
3
. In this case, each of them will
get: V2=210 ECU. If one of patient depositors withdraws: f=23 , the depositor that keeps,
will get: V2=0 ECU, the depositor that withdraws, will get V1=150 ECU. If both of them
withdraw: f=1. In this case, a depositor will get: V1=150 ECU if he is the first or the
second in a queue, and V1=0 ECU if he is the third. There are two Nash equilibria in
pure strategies: when all patient depositors are keeping the money and only impatient
withdraws, and when everybody withdraws the money (see Table 1).
Table 1: Diamond and Dybvig model: a numerical example
Keep Withdraw
Keep (U(210);U(210)) (U(0);U(150))
Withdraw (U(150);U(0)) (2
3
× U(150) + 1
3
× U(0); 2
3
× U(150) + 1
3
× U(0))
Now assume there are two identical independent banks like the one described above. Let’s
call them Bank I and Bank II for convenience. In this case, we apply the standard DD
model but applied twice. That is why there are four Nash equilibria in pure strategies:
Eq I: Patient depositors of both banks keep (KKKK)
Eq II: Patient depositors of both banks withdraw (WWWW)
Eq III: Patient depositors of Bank I keep, patient depositors of Bank II withdraw
(KKWW)
Eq IV: Patient depositors of Bank I withdraw, patient depositors of Bank I keep (WWKK)
Now let’s assume the same two banks as before, but besides keeping and withdrawing,
depositors of Bank I can redeposit the money to Bank II at T=1. It can be found that
r∗1=1.5, r∗2=2.1, r∗3=1.4 (see Equation 4). As before, everyone has 100 ECU as a deposit,
thus withdrawing at T=1 a depositor receives 150 ECU, whereas keeping till T=2 as well
as redepositing brings him 210 ECU.17. In this case, there are the following four Nash
equilibria in pure strategies (for a proof see Appendix II):18
16 It has 300 ECU in total and has to pay 150 ECU at T=1 per person
17 Withdrawing from Bank I, a client will get 150 ECU. Then redepositing this amount to Bank II will
give him the final payoff of 150 × 1.4=210 ECU
18 It can be easily shown that the stated above equilibria remain such for the N players’ case, although
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Eq I: Patient depositors of both banks keep (KKKK)
Eq II: Patient depositors of both banks withdraw (WWWW)
Eq III: Patient depositors of Bank I keep, patient depositors of Bank II withdraw
(KKWW)
Eq IV: Patient depositors of Bank I redeposit, patient depositors of Bank II keep
(RRKK)19
Comparing equilibria for two models, you can see that when there is an option to redeposit
the money from one bank to another, depositors are supposed to use it (RRKK) instead
of merely withdrawing (WWKK). In other words, the possibility to choose among banks
makes depositors to keep money within a banking system instead of keeping it "under
the pillow", which should lead to fewer cases of simultaneous bank runs (banking panics).
As far as the optimal behavior differs across two versions of the model, it strengthens the
motivation to conduct experimental research to test whether the behavior of real subjects
also changes following theoretical predictions.
4 Experimental Design and Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the University of Milan among the bachelor, master
and PhD students who study economics, politics or law. When selecting the participants,
there were no preferences regarding their gender or age. After entering the lab, subjects
were randomly assigned to the computers and given paper instructions that were also
read out-loud. The instructions had the description of the experimental procedures, as
well as the description of the game (see Appendix III, IV) including the payoff matrices
to reduce the complexity of computations to a minimum. After the clarification questions
were answered in person, the experiment started.
There were two experimental treatments conducted. Each of the treatments began with
the incentivized version of the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (Crosetto and Filippin (2013))
to control for the level of risk aversion of individuals. Then the bank run game was
played 20 times. After the game was completed, each subject was asked about one’s
as the number of players increases, the new equilibria may arise. The focus of the current research is
not only to find an optimal theoretical solution for the game but mainly to check whether it is being
understood and applied by the subjects of the experiment. As far as there are three subjects per game,
we are interested in finding Nash equilibria for the three-players’ case.
19 It is important that depositors of Bank II play "keep" in equilibrium. In case they withdraw, the second
bank goes through a bank runs, so the money of redepositors is used to pay off to early withdrawers.
Thus, subjects who redeposit never get what was promised.
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gender, age, and educational background. Then the subjects were paid according to their
performance. The final payoff was calculated as the sum of three components: the show-
up fee, the payment for the BRET task and the payoff of one randomly chosen periods of
the bank-run game multiplied by 0.02 (for more details, see Appendix III,IV).20
The only difference between two treatments was the structure of the bank run game.
At the core of the first treatment lies the model of DD with one bank. The results of
Treatment I were extrapolated for the case of two independent banks which allowed the
comparison between treatments. For Treatment II, the model of DD with a redepositing
option was used. Subjects were randomly assigned to Bank I or Bank II at the beginning
of the game and dependent on the bank could keep/withdraw or redeposit.21
In both treatments, I have applied the same parameters of the model as provided in the
numerical example above. Each subject has 100 ECU as a deposit. There were three
depositors per each bank: two of them were the participants, and one more (an impatient
depositor) was replicated by the computer.22 At the beginning of the game, each player
was randomly matched with another player to be depositors of the same bank. For the
second treatment, there were cohorts of 4 players formed (two players of Bank I and two
players of Bank II). Initial matchings within and across banks stayed for the whole game
of 20 rounds.23
At the end of each round, there was some feedback provided to the subjects. In accordance
with the literature (Arifovic et al. (2013), Madies (2006), Brown et al. (2016)) a subject
from each of the treatments could observe: (1) the entire history of his and all other
players’ decisions; (2) the history of earnings; (3) his position in a queue for every round
when he withdrew or redeposited.
Considering the literature, I have formulated the following three hypotheses. All of them
20 The same approach is applied by Brown et al. (2016), Kiss et al. (2012), Kiss et al. (2014). An
alternative is to pay the total earnings made during the game (Garratt and Keister (2009), Madies
(2006), Arifovic et al. (2013)). However, the latter approach suffers from possible wealth effects thus
was not used in the paper.
21 In case of withdrawals, the position in a queue (being 1st, 2nd or 3rd among withdrawers) was decided
randomly by the computer.
22 As far as the impatient player always withdraws the money, substituting it with an automaton doesn’t
seem to have any influence on the results. The same way of reasoning is applied in the literature. See
Kiss et al. (2014).
23 There are two approaches regarding the way players are coupled in the bank-run games. The first
way is to reshuﬄe the group of players every time a new round starts (Kiss et al. (2014), Garratt and
Keister (2009)). The second approach is to keep the initial matching of players over the game (Arifovic
et al. (2013), Madies (2006), Brown et al. (2016), Chakravarty et al. (2014)). The latter approach was
chosen to be applied because it allows studying learning effects which is one of the points of interest
for the current research.
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are tested in the next section of the paper.
Hypothesis I - Bank runs and Banking Panics
Introduction of a possibility to redeposit leads to significantly different frequencies of with-
drawals and bank failures across banks. Overall, simultaneous bank runs should happen
less often in Treatment II than in Treatment I.
Comparing equilibria across treatments, you can see that the only difference is the fourth
equilibria according to which subjects of Bank I are better of redepositing rather than
withdrawing from Bank I when depositors of Bank II are keeping the money in the bank.
Due to that, subjects of Bank I should redeposit rather than withdraw, which should
lead to less simultaneous bank runs in the second treatment. Overall, I expect that in
Treatment II depositors of Bank I leave it more often than in Treatment I, being provided
with a choice among banks. Consequently, there are more withdrawals and bank runs
in Bank I. At the same time, depositors of Bank II should withdraw and panic less in
expectation of depositors from Bank I joining their bank.
Hypothesis II - Equilibria and Learning
In both treatments, among all the equilibria possible, I expect the ones that give the highest
payoffs to be played more often.24 In the second treatment, subjects tend to play equilibria
less frequently than in the first one. However, in both treatments, subjects learn how to
coordinate with time.
As far as in the second treatment subjects of Bank I have to choose from two instead
of three actions, the coordination problem gets more complicated. That is why I expect
equilibria to occur less frequently in the second than in the first treatment. At the same
time, I forecast subjects to learn and get better at coordinating. In the first treatment,
subjects get more if they all keep the money in the corresponding bank. Thus, I expect
the good equilibrium (KKKK) to be played more often. In the second treatment, there
are two equilibria (KKKK, RRKK) that give the highest payoffs possible. That is why I
expect them to be played more times than the other equilibria in the game.
Hypothesis III - Personal Characteristics and Withdrawals
The decision to keep the money in a bank depends not only on the treatment but also on
the subject’s risk aversion and previous experiences with the bank. Risk averse subjects are
more reluctant to stay with the bank than risk neutral and risk seeking subjects. Besides
24 The majority of experimental literature which applies the DD model shows that subjects tend to play
the payoff-dominant equilibrium Garratt and Keister (2009),Madies (2006),Chakravarty et al. (2014).
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that, if a person has experienced bank runs in the past, he will be more reluctant to keep
the money in this bank in the future.
Garratt and Keister (2009), Kiss et al. (2014) conclude that the fraction of previous
rounds in which a subject witnessed a bank run has a significant effect on his withdrawal
behavior. The higher is the fraction, the bigger is the probability of him withdrawing
in the future. That is why, I consider the history of previously occurred bank runs to
be relevant to the subject’s choices. Although, Kiss et al. (2014) experimentally show
that risk aversion has no predictive power, theoretical an empirical literature claims the
opposite. Using the DD model, it is easy to show that subjects with constant relative risk
averse utility function should panic earlier the higher is their level of risk aversion.25 In
other words, if subject A is more risk averse than subject B and the latter one withdraws
when M subjects are expected to do so, subject A should withdraw even earlier - when
M-L subjects are expected to run on the bank. Thus, in case subjects are highly risk
averse, they will withdraw in expectation of even a small number of withdrawals, which
proves that withdrawals may be partially explained by the high level of risk aversion of
depositors (Saunders and Wilson (1996)). That is why, I expect risk aversion to play an
important role on withdrawal behavior.
5 Results
In total 108 subjects participated in the experiment: 36 subjects participated in Treat-
ment I and 72 subjects (36 subjects per bank) participated in Treatment II. The actual
average payment for the BRET task and the bank-run game are 4.2 Euro and 2.8 Euro
correspondingly.
In Table 2, I provide some averaged statistics on overall data sample as well as compare
data distributions across treatments with the help of the Chi-squared test. As you can
see, more women than men took part in the experiment. Most of the subjects are not
more than 26 years old. The sample is spread almost evenly concerning the educational
background of subjects. The participants are mainly risk averse, whereas less than 15%
are risk seekers. Overall, the sample is quite homogeneous: based on the results of the
Chi-squared test, the age, gender, risk aversion and educational background of subjects
do not vary significantly across experimental treatments.
One of the key research questions of the paper is whether the availability of an option
25 For the detailed proof see Horváth and Kiss (2016).
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Table 2: Data Sample Structure
Parameter Description Fraction Prob. chi2
Gender Female/Male 56% / 44% 0.89
Major of Studies Economics /Politics /Legal Studies 33% / 35% / 32% 0.19
Risk Attitudes Averse/Neutral/Lover 81% / 6% / 13% 0.98
Age Below 20 / 20-25 / Above 25 42% / 54% / 4% 0.42
to redeposit leads to less bank runs in the economy. To analyze that, for each cohort of
subjects that formed a system of banks, I have calculated the number of times during the
game (out of 20 possible) a group experienced a bankruptcy of none, one or two banks
in a system.26 I analyze the frequency of full bank runs across treatments, considering
a bank run to be full (or "pure-panic" run as it is called by Madies (2006)) when all its
initial depositors withdraw. With the help of Mann-Whitney U test, I test whether the
differences in the number of runs are significant across treatments and banks (see Table
3).
As you can see, there are more cases of at least one bank run in a system with a possibility
to redeposit. In the first treatment, there are no runs in 13 rounds on average, whereas
in the second treatment only in 9 rounds on average none of the banks experience a
run. Besides that, for the second treatment, the frequency of individual runs significantly
varies across banks. If we consider the bank from the first treatment as a baseline for
the comparison, there are 2.5 more cases of Bank I runs and 4 times fewer cases of Bank
II runs in the second treatment. In other words, provided with a choice among banks,
depositors of Bank I leave it more often causing additional bank runs, but at the same
time the bank-recipient (Bank II) experience fewer bankruptcies. Indeed, there are fewer
cases of simultaneous bank runs in the second treatment, although the difference is not
significant. It leads to the partial rejection of the first hypothesis ("Bank Runs and
Banking Panics") since only the number of individual bank runs is significantly different
across treatments.
The additional evidence of how a redepositing option influences the stability of each
bank and the system as a whole comes from the net cash flow analysis. In order to see
whether subjects use an option to redeposit and how does it affect banks’ stability, I
have estimated the average net cash flows for each of the banks27 and for the system as
a whole (see Table 4). Withdrawn amounts were considered as cash outflows, whereas
26 Each cohort consisted of 4 subjects. For the first treatment, I have extrapolated the results for one
bank (2 subjects) to the two banks’ case assuming two banks being identical and independent.
27 The bank from the first treatment was used as the baseline for Mann-Whitney U test comparison.
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Table 3: The average number of full bank runs across treatments and banks (Mann-
Whitney U test)
Treatment I Treatment II p - value
None 13 9 0.04(65%) (45%)
Bank I 9 0.004 (45%)
Bank II (20%) 1 0.08(5%)
Two banks 3 1 0.71
(15%) (5%)
redeposited amounts as cash inflows. I have conducted Mann-Whitney U test to check
whether net cash flows are significantly different across banks and systems. The bank
in the first treatment experienced the net cash outflow (-83.73), whereas Bank II had a
positive net balance due to subjects of Bank I reallocating their deposits. At the same
time, Bank I experienced a more substantial net cash outflow (-136.25) than the bank in
the first treatment (-83.73).28 Overall, the cash outflow from the system of banks with a
redepositing option is on average lower than from a system without such an opportunity,
although the difference is not statistically significant.
Table 4: The net cash flow (Mann-Whitney U test)
Treatment Mean (ECU) p-value
Bank I I -83.73 0.02II -136.25
Bank II I -83.73 0.00II 56.12
System I -167.46 0.17
II -80.13
Result I: In a banking system where subjects can relocate their deposits, there are more
cases of at least one bank run happening. As long as subjects use a redepositing option,
it is Bank I that mostly suffers from bankruptcies, whereas Bank II gets more stable due
to additional funds from depositors of the first bank. Overall, the net amount withdrawn
from the system does not vary significantly across treatments, which explains almost the
same number of simultaneous bank runs.
To contribute to the analysis, I study how often depositors play each of the possible
28 All stated above differences are significant at 5% level.
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actions during the game (see Table 5). In the first treatment, almost two-thirds of the
times players keep the money in a bank, whereas in the second treatment, players of Bank
I do it only 35% times on average (see Table 5). Considering it together with a decrease
in withdrawals (23%), it becomes clear that the possibility to redeposit makes subjects to
keep the money in Bank I less often. Besides that, players of Bank II withdraw less than
players in the first treatment: they keep the money in a bank 76% of the times compared
with 62% in Treatment I.
In the second treatment, there is a clear tendency by subjects of the first bank to keep
less whereas withdraw and redeposit more over time. Also, subjects of the second bank
keep the money much more often (83%) in the second half than in the first half of the
game. The same does not hold for the subjects of the first treatment, although in the
first round of the game they show a similar pattern in behavior (keep around two-thirds
of the times). One may claim that an increasing tendency to keep may be explained
by the fact that depositors of the second bank experience better outcomes in the first
half of the game due to redepositing. However, I do not find the evidence for that: the
average payoff of Bank II subjects who keep and subjects from the first treatment who
keep are not significantly different.29 It proves that an increase in the number of times
depositors of the second bank keep the money, is driven not by better outcomes of the
game in its first half, but rather by subject’s expectations that: (1) the counterpart will
not withdraw; (2) players of the first bank will redeposit.
Table 5: Actions played by subjects across treatments and banks
Time Treatment I: Bank Treatment II: Bank I Treatment II: Bank II
Keep Withdraw Keep Withdraw Redeposit Keep Withdraw
First 10
Rounds 61% 39% 39% 20% 41% 69% 31%
Second 10
Rounds 63% 37% 30% 26% 44% 83% 17%
All
Rounds 62% 38% 35% 23% 42% 76% 24%
Result II: When there is a choice among banks, subjects tend to redeposit the money
from one bank to another rather than to keep it "under the pillow". Subjects of the
bank-recipient mainly keep the money in the bank; such a tendency grows with time.
Besides observing individual decisions of subjects, it is interesting to analyze how well
the players coordinate their moves. For the reasons of comparability, I extrapolate ex-
perimental results of the first treatment on the two banks’ case. I estimate ex post what
29 This conclusion is based on the results of Mann-Whitney U test. The corresponding p-value is 0.59.
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would be the fraction of equilibria played in the first treatment assuming two banks func-
tioning independently. Comparing the results, I find that in both treatments the most
commonly played equilibrium is a "good equilibrium" when all the depositors keep the
money in a bank (see Table 6). In the second treatment, there is one more equilibrium
that is played as often: when players of Bank I redeposit their money to Bank II while
all the subjects of that bank are keeping their deposits. All of that supports my second
hypothesis ("Equilibria and Learning"). WWWW and KKWW are played much less fre-
quently in Treatment II than in Treatment I: in less than 5% of the cases in total. Besides
that, in Treatment II there are more cases when none of the equilibria is played. Because
players of Bank I are provided with three rather than two options, it gets more difficult
to coordinate.
Table 6: Equilibria across treatments
KKKK WWWW KKWW WWKK No
Treatment I 24% 6% 12% 12% 45%
KKKK WWWW KKWW RRKK No
Treatment II 14% 2% 2% 14% 68%
Subjects play equilibria more often as time elapses, which goes hand in hand with my
second hypothesis ("Equilibria and Learning"). Figure 1 and Figure 2 show how frequently
each of the equilibria happens in the first 10 and in the last 10 rounds of the game. In
both treatments, subjects tend to coordinate better in the second than in the first part
of the game. In the first treatment, subjects play each of the equilibria more often as the
game evolves. Whereas in Treatment II, only KKKK and RRKK equilibria are played
more frequently. Such an increase is driven by the significant rise in the number of times
subjects of Bank II play "keep" in the second half of the game and better coordination
among the players.
Result III: In both treatments the most commonly played equilibrium is a good one.
Besides that, in Treatment II subjects of Bank I tend to redeposit the money while players
of the second bank keep (RRKK). In Treatment I subjects learn how to coordinate and
play all possible equilibria more often with time. In Treatment II only KKKK and RRKK
are becoming more recurrent, which is the result of both better coordination and the
second bank’ subjects keeping the money more often.
Previously, it has been shown that subjects learn over time how to coordinate their actions.
However, it is even more important to understand what triggers which action, mainly the
decision to keep or not to keep money in a bank. To study which factors influence the
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Figure 1: Equilibria in time - Treatment I
Figure 2: Equilibria in time - Treatment II
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subject’s choices, I am using the following regression model:
Ki,t = β0 + β1 × Treatment_II_Bank_IIi + β2 × Treatment_II_Bank_Ii+
+ β3 × Previous_Ratio_Runsi,t + β4 ×Malei + β5 ×Risk_Aversei + β6 ×Roundt
(10)
, where Ki,t - a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if a player keeps and 0 if a player with-
draws/redeposits the money; Treatment_II_Bank_IIi - a dummy equal to 1 for the
players of the second bank of the second treatment; Treatment_II_Bank_Ii - a dummy
equal to 1 for the players of the first bank of the second treatment 30; Previous_Ratio_Runsi,t
- the ratio of previous full bank runs lived by the agent; Malei - a dummy equal to 1 for
males; Risk_Aversei - a dummy equal to 1 for risk averse players; Roundt - the round
of the game
I test for the treatment effects as well as check whether subjects’ choices vary across banks.
Besides that, I control for the subject’s previous experiences as well as for the gender and
risk aversion, because one’s personal characteristics may play a role in his/her decisions.
As far as the game is played several times, I have included the time trend in the model.
In Table 7, I report the coefficients for the OLS regression model.31 The standard errors
provided in the brackets are bootstrapped due to the presence of heteroscedasticity.32
The model was checked for multicollinearity and omitted variables, none of that was
identified.33 Considering subjects of the first treatment as a baseline category, it is clear
that depositors of the second bank keep less whereas depositors of the first bank keep
more in the second treatment. The previous experiences of a subject play a significant
role: going through more bank runs in the past, a subject gets cautious keeping less in
the future. The gender of a participant does not play a significant role, whereas his risk-
attitudes are essential. Risk averse subjects keep significantly less than all others. Lastly,
subjects play "keep" less with time, although this result is not significant. Overall, my
30 In here I consider initial bank allocation
31 Based on the results of Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects; there is
no significant evidence of the panel effects, thus simple OLS seems to be an appropriate choice. A
fixed-effects model is not suitable mainly due to the specification of the model, but also based on the
results of the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test.
32 Heteroscedasticity was identified with the help of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test.
33 To test for multicollinearity and omitted variables, I used the VIFs factors and the Ramsey test
correspondingly.
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Table 7: Decision to keep: what does it depend on?
Ki,t
Treatment_II_Bank_Ii -0.348∗∗∗
(0.028)
Treatment_II_Bank_IIi 0.189∗∗∗
(0.027)
Previous_Ratio_Runsi,t -0.275∗∗∗
(0.063)
Malei -0.010
(0.020)
Risk_Aversei -0.147∗∗∗
(0.026)
Roundt -0.001
(0.002)
Constant 0.960∗∗∗
(0.063)
N 2052
R2 0.147
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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predictions regarding the effect of risk aversion and previous experiences of the subject
on withdrawal behavior are correct.
Result IV: The subject’s decision to keep the money in a bank depends on one’s risk-
attitudes and previous experiences. Overall, bank runs are contaminating: if they hap-
pened in the past, it increases the chance of them occurring in the future. Risk averse
subjects are more reluctant to keep money in a bank than risk neutral and risk seeking
individuals.
6 Conclusions and discussion
In the current paper, I propose a unique extension of the Diamond and Dybvig model in
which a subject is given a possibility to change the initial deposit allocation. To avoid
a situation when a healthier bank attracts a weaker bank’s depositors, I assume that
two banks have the same fundamentals. It allows me to preserve the original idea of the
Diamond and Dybvig model that bank runs are the result of a pure coordination problem
and to test how the availability of choice among banks influences subjects’ withdrawal
behavior. Whether depositors withdraw or redeposit is essential for the regulators of a
banking sector, because these two actions have a different effect on the banking system’s
liquidity. That is why I consider the results of the current research to be of particular
interest to the policymakers and the regulators of the banking sector.
I find both theoretically and experimentally that the introduction of a redepositing op-
tion leads to more cases of individual bank runs. Being provided with the redepositing
option, depositors tend to change their initial deposit allocation more often than when
such an option is not available. At the same time, the bank which receives new clients
experiences significantly less bank runs. In both experimental treatments (with and with-
out redepositing) the most commonly played equilibrium is the good one when all the
subjects keep the money in the corresponding bank. Besides that, in the treatment where
the redepositing option is available, subjects actively use it under the condition that the
subjects of the bank-recipient keep the money. Subjects learn how to coordinate over
time and play equilibria more frequently in the second than in the first half of the game.
The subject’s choice to keep or not the money in a bank depends on one’s previous expe-
riences with the bank. Bank runs are contagious: if they happened in the past, they are
more likely to occur in the future. Besides that, I find that risk attitudes affect subjects’
decisions: risk averse subjects are more reluctant to keep money in a bank than all others.
30
Overall, I find that in the banking system where subjects can relocate their deposits from
one bank to another, the rate of bank runs differs across banks. I find that in this case,
the number of simultaneous runs gets less although insignificantly. However, I expect
this conclusion to change in case banks have different fundamentals. Besides that, in
the current version of the model, there are no transaction costs in case of redepositing.
Introduction of heterogeneity across banks as well as transaction costs may be considered
as a promising extension which may shed light on the problem of banking panics.
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Appendix I - Diamond and Dybvig model - optimality conditions
From equation (1), it can be derived:
MRS1,2 =
MU1
MU2
=
U ′r1
U ′r2
=
t× U ′r1
(1− t)× U ′r2
=
R× t
1− t (11)
Finally: U ′(r1) = R × U ′(r2)t× r1 + (1− t)× r2 × 1R = 1 (12)
It is assumed that U=U(C) is risk averse, so U ′(C) is decreasing. Thus from the system
(14) and an assumption that R>1, the conclusion is that r∗1 < r∗2. Besides that, from the
system (14), it is cleat that:
U ′(r1) = R× U ′ (1-t×r1
1− t × R) (13)
If r1=1, equation (15) can be rewritten:
U ′(r1) = U ′(1) = R× U ′(R) (14)
According to the model U=U(C) should have the coefficient of RRA>1, ∀ C ∈ [1;R], so
∀ γ ∈ [1;R] the following holds:- γ × U”(γ)
U ′(γ) >1, thus:
R×U’(R) = 1×U’(1)+
∫ R
γ=1
∂
∂γ
(γ×U’(γ))∂γ = U’(1)+
∫ R
γ=1
(U’(γ)+γ U”(γ))∂γ < U ′(1)
(15)
Thus, when r1=1, U’(r1)=U’(1) and R×U’(1-t×r11−t × R) < U’(1). U’(r1) is decreasing,
whereas U’(1-t×r1
1−t × R) is increasing with respect to r1, so r∗1 >1.
From equation (14) one can derive that r2 = 1-t×r11−t × R. Because r∗1>1, 1-t×r11−t < 1, so
r∗2<R. At the end, 1<r∗1<r∗2<R.
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Appendix II - Nash equilibria in pure strategies for the model with
redepositing: a numerical example
Let’s call the clients of Bank I as Player I, Player II and Player III. They can decide
whether to keep (K), withdraw (W) or redeposit the money to Bank II (R). Let’s name
clients of Bank II – Player IV, Player V and Player VI. They can either keep (K) or
withdraw (W) the money from Bank II. Let’s assume that Player III and Player VI are
impatient
Then using the payoff functions provided above the game can be represented in the normal
form and four equilibria can be found (see Tables below):34
Equilibrium I: all patient players in each of the banks keep the money (KKKK)
Equilibrium II: all players of both banks withdraw their deposits (WWWW)
Equilibrium III: all patient depositors of Bank I keep the money while the ones of Bank
II withdraw (KKWW)
Equilibrium IV: all patient players of Bank II redeposit the money while all patient
depositors of Bank II keep (RRKK)
34 The payoffs for the impatient players are not in the table for the matter of convenience as far as
impatient subjects always withdraw. Thus the payoffs are represented in the form: (Payoff of Player
I; Payoff of Player II; Payoff of Player IV; Payoff of Player V)
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Appendix III - Experimental Instructions: Treatment I
Welcome to the Experiment!
The current experiment is devoted to economic decision-making. It consists of a small
task followed by a game. In the end, you will be asked to fill in a small questionnaire. If
you have any questions or need help, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to
your place and answer your questions in private. Communication with other participants
is prohibited. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid for participation.
Figure 3: The timeline of the game
Description of the task
First, you will be asked to do a small task. On the computer screen, you will see a field
composed of 100 numbered boxes. Behind one of these boxes hides a mine; all the other
99 boxes are free from mines. You do not know where this mine lies. You only know that
the mine can be in any place with equal probability. Your task is to choose how many
boxes to collect. Boxes will be collected in numerical order. So, you will be asked to
choose a number between 1 and 100. You confirm your choice by hitting ‘OK’.
Figure 4: BRET task
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At the end of the experiment, we will randomly determine the number of the box con-
taining the mine by means of a bag containing 100 numbered tokens. Every participant
will have its own position of a bomb. If you happen to have harvested the box where the
mine is located – i.e., if your chosen number is greater than or equal to the drawn number
– you will earn zero. If the mine is located in a box that you did not harvest – i.e., if
your chosen number is smaller than the drawn number – you will earn in euro an amount
equivalent to the number you have chosen divided by ten. You will know how much have
you earned only at the end of the experiment. After the task is done, you will proceed to
the next stage of the experiment which is the game.
Description of the game
There is a bank that has 3 clients. Each of them has 100 ECU, so in total 300 ECU,
that is initially kept in a bank in the form of a deposit. Deposit contract lasts for one
experimental period, but the client has the right to withdraw his money during the period.
The bank has 300 ECU invested in a project that gives a return of R=280% only if the
money stays invested during all the period. For instance, if the bank invested 300 ECU,
but during the period had to take part of it out (if needed): X ECU, the interest will be
paid only on the amount that stayed the entire period invested: on (300-X) ECU. The
amount is taken from the project during the period: X ECU doesn’t bring any return,
thus being considered at a nominal value. All the return earned is shared among the
clients that stay with the bank at the end of the period. The bank knows with certainty
that 1 out of 3 players will withdraw the money before the period ends. Regarding other
2 clients, it assumes that they will stay with the bank until the end of the period. Making
this assumption the bank promises in the deposit contract to pay 210 ECU per client that
stays with the bank and 150 ECU to the client who withdraws. So, the bank expects to
take 150 ECU out of the project to pay to the withdrawer. Indeed, if the assumption
of the bank turns out to be not correct and less than 2 clients in total stay with the
bank (more than 1 withdraws), the bank must use more funds to pay to those who are
withdrawing. As far as the funds need to be taken out during the period, there is no
return on the investment yet. That is why the maximum amount that the bank can take
out is 300 ECU. Thus, the bank has enough money only for a maximum of 2 withdrawals
if happen (150 ECU per each). If 2 clients withdraw, each will get 150 ECU whereas the
third who decided to stay with a bank will get 0 ECU as far as the bank will run out of
money after two withdrawals. If 3 clients withdraw, the first and the second withdrawing
get 150 ECU, whereas the third one gets 0 ECU. If the player withdraws, his/her position
in the queue is defined randomly at the end of the period.
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Your task
You will play a role of a depositor in a bank. Before the game starts, all the participants
will be randomly divided into groups of 2. So, apart from you, there will be one more
player randomly assigned to your bank. You will always play the game with the same
person, that is initially matched with you. In total, there will be 3 depositors per bank:
2 depositors that are real people (you and another person) and 1 more depositor that will
be generated by the computer (from now on, called automaton).
Remember that the automaton always withdraws the money.
You and your counterpart will be asked whether you want to KEEP your money in a
bank or to WITHDRAW it. You don’t know what your counterpart will do, but your
payoff depends on his decision.
If you KEEP:
Counterpart KEEP Counterpart WITHDRAW
You get 210 ECU 0 ECU
If your counterpart keeps, the assumption of the bank that only automaton withdraws
holds and you get as promised 210 ECU. If your counterpart withdraws, the bank needs
all 300 ECU to pay two withdrawers, so you get 0 ECU.
If you WITHDRAW:
Position Counterpart KEEP Counterpart WITHDRAW
You get if 1st: 150 ECU 150 ECU
You get if 2nd:
You get if 3rd: - 0 ECU
If your counterpart keeps, you and automaton withdraws, you will get 150 ECU anyway,
as far as the bank has money for two withdrawers. If your counterpart withdraws, only
the first two will get 150 ECU, the third will get 0 ECU.
Keep in mind that your position in the “queue” will be defined randomly after
both participants decided.
Feedback
After both players decided, you will be provided with a short statistic for the game(s)
played. The game will be played 21 times (rounds). The first time will be a TRIAL, so
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Figure 5: Decision screen
will NOT influence your final payoff, whereas all others may influence your final payoff.
You will know how much have you earned only at the end of the experiment: we will
choose the number randomly from 1 to 20 which will tell us the payoff of which round of
the game will be used for your final payment calculation.
Questionnaire
After you finished the game, you will be asked to fill in a small questionnaire regarding
your age, gender and the major of your studies. All the information will be used only for
the current research.
Final payoff
For the calculation of the final payoff, we will consider both what you have earned doing
the first task and the payoff of one round of the game, chosen randomly.
Task I:
If you collected a bomb: Payoff Task I (Euro)=0
If you did not collect a bomb: Payoff Task I (Euro) = Number of boxes collected × 0.1
Task II:
Payoff Task II (Euro) = Payoff of one of the randomly chosen rounds × 0.02
Final:
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Show-up fee = 2.5 Euro
Final payoff = Show-up fee + Payoff Task I + Payoff Task II
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Appendix IV - Experimental Instructions: Treatment II
Welcome to the Experiment!
The current experiment is devoted to economic decision-making. It consists of a small
task followed by a game. In the end, you will be asked to fill in a small questionnaire. If
you have any questions or need help, please raise your hand. An experimenter will come to
your place and answer your questions in private. Communication with other participants
is prohibited. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid for participation.
Figure 6: The timeline of the game
Description of the task
First, you will be asked to do a small task. On the computer screen, you will see a field
composed of 100 numbered boxes. Behind one of these boxes hides a mine; all the other
99 boxes are free from mines. You do not know where this mine lies. You only know that
the mine can be in any place with equal probability. Your task is to choose how many
boxes to collect. Boxes will be collected in numerical order. So, you will be asked to
choose a number between 1 and 100. You confirm your choice by hitting ‘OK’.
Figure 7: BRET task
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At the end of the experiment, we will randomly determine the number of the box con-
taining the mine by means of a bag containing 100 numbered tokens. Every participant
will have its own position of a bomb. If you happen to have harvested the box where the
mine is located – i.e., if your chosen number is greater than or equal to the drawn number
– you will earn zero. If the mine is located in a box that you did not harvest – i.e., if
your chosen number is smaller than the drawn number – you will earn in euro an amount
equivalent to the number you have chosen divided by ten. You will know how much have
you earned only at the end of the experiment. After the task is done, you will proceed to
the next stage of the experiment which is the game.
Description of the game
There are two banks: Bank I and Bank II. Each of the banks has 3 clients (different ones).
Each of the clients has 100 ECU, so in total 300 ECU, that is initially kept in each bank
in the form of a deposit.
Bank I
Each client of Bank I has a deposit contract that lasts for one experimental period, but
the client has the right to take his/her money out of the bank during the period. The
same as Bank I, Bank II has 300 ECU invested in a project that gives a return of R=280%
only if the money stays invested during all the period. For instance, if the bank invested
300 ECU, but during the period had to take part of it out (if needed): X ECU, the interest
will be paid only on the amount that stayed the entire period invested: on (300-X) ECU.
The amount is taken from the project during the period: X ECU doesn’t bring any return,
thus being considered at a nominal value.
The bank knows with certainty that 1 out of 3 players will withdraw the money before
the period ends. Regarding other 2 clients, it assumes that they will stay with the bank
until the end of the period.
Making this assumption the bank promises in the deposit contract to pay 210 ECU per
client that stays with the bank and 150 ECU to the client who withdraws. So, the bank
expects to take 150 ECU out of the project to pay to the withdrawer.
Indeed, if the assumption of the bank turns out to be not correct and less than 2 clients
in total stay with the bank (more than 1 withdraws), the bank must use more funds to
pay to those who are withdrawing.
As far as the funds need to be taken out during the period, there is no return on the
investment yet. That is why the maximum amount that the bank can take out is 300
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ECU. Thus, the bank has enough money only for a maximum of 2 withdrawals if happen
(150 ECU per each).
If 2 clients withdraw, each will get 150 ECU whereas the third who decided to stay with
a bank will get 0 ECU as far as the bank will run out of money after two withdrawals. If
3 clients withdraw, the first and the second withdrawing get 150 ECU, whereas the third
one gets 0 ECU.
Players of Bank I have a choice whether to KEEP the money in Bank I, WITHDRAW
the money from it or REDEPOSIT the money to Bank II. The player can REDEPOSIT
conditional on whether he can WITHDRAW. If the player decides to redeposit the money
to Bank II, he first needs to take the money from Bank I and can get 150 ECU (if the
1st or 2nd in the queue) or 0 ECU (if the 3rd in the queue). If he gets 0 ECU– he/she
has nothing to redeposit. If he gets 150 ECU, all the amount of money: 150 ECU is
redeposited. If the player decides to withdraw/redeposit his position in the queue is
defined randomly at the end of the period. So, the player learns only at the end of the
period if his claim for redepositing was successful.
Bank II
The same as Bank I, Bank II has 300 ECU invested in a project that gives a return of
R=280% only if the money stays invested during all the period. For instance, if the bank
invested 300 ECU, but during the period had to take part of it out (if needed): X ECU,
the interest will be paid only on the amount that stayed the entire period invested: on
(300-X) ECU. The amount is taken from the project during the period: X ECU doesn’t
bring any return, thus being considered at a nominal value. All the return earned is
shared among the clients that stay with the bank at the end of the period.
Bank II knows with certainty that 1 out of 3 initial clients will withdraw the money before
the period ends. Regarding other 2 clients, it assumes that they will stay with the bank
until the end of the period.
Making this assumption the bank promises to its initial clients in the deposit contract
to pay 210 ECU per client that stays with the bank and 150 ECU to the client who
withdraws.
Apart from that, Bank II has an additional project in which it invests money that is
redeposited within the period by players of Bank I. The project gives a return only at the
end of the period. Still holding an assumption that only 1 initial player will withdraw,
Bank II proposes an additional deposit contract for “redepositors”: it promises to pay 210
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ECU at the end of the period.
Indeed, if the assumption of the bank turns out to be not correct and less than 2 initial
clients stay with the bank (more than 1 withdraws), the bank must use additional funds
during the period to pay to those who are withdrawing.
In this case, the bank (if needed) can use all the money available: from the first projects
at a nominal value and what is redeposited.
The maximum amount that the bank can take out is 300 ECU from the first project and
up to 300 ECU (depends on how many people will decide to redeposit - maximum two)
from redepositors.
In this case, the amount invested in the second project will be less than initially expected
as far as part of the funds that came from redepositors will be used to pay to withdrawers.
In this situation, those, who withdraw from Bank II get the money (150 ECU or 0 ECU)
upon availability and dependent on the position in the queue, which is defined randomly
at the end of the period.
And those who stay with the bank till the end of the period (depositors of Bank II who
keep and depositors of Bank I who redeposited), get an equal share of all the money left
at the end of the period (see details below).
Your task
You will play a role of a depositor in Bank I or in Bank II. Before the game starts, all
the participants will be randomly divided into groups of 4. Then two out of four players
will be assigned to Bank I, other two – to Bank II. In total, there will be 3 depositors per
bank: 2 depositors that are real people (you and another person assigned to you) and 1
more depositor that will be generated by the computer (From now on, called automaton).
You will be assigned either to Bank I or to Bank II. Apart from you, there will be one
more player randomly assigned to your bank. Being assigned to Bank I/ Bank II keeps
till the end of the experiment. This holds for every player. Also, you will always play the
game with the same three people that are initially matched with you.
Player of Bank I:
You and your counterpart (another player of Bank I) will be asked whether you want to
KEEP, WITHDRAW or REDEPOSIT your money.
Remember that the automaton always withdraws the money.
If you KEEP:
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Counterpart KEEP Counterpart WITHDRAW Counterpart REDEPOSIT
You get 210 ECU 0 ECU
If your counterpart keeps, the assumption of the bank that only automaton withdraws
holds and you get as promised 210 ECU. If your counterpart withdraws, the bank needs
all 300 ECU to pay two withdrawers, so you get 0 ECU.
If you WITHDRAW:
Counterpart KEEP Counterpart WITHDRAW Counterpart REDEPOSIT
You get if 1st 150 ECU 150 ECU
You get if 2nd
You get if 3rd - 0 ECU
If your counterpart keeps, you and automaton withdraws, you will get 150 ECU anyway,
as far as the bank has money for two withdrawers. If your counterpart withdraws, only
the first two will get 150 ECU, the third will get 0 ECU.
Keep in mind that your position in the “queue” will be defined randomly after
both participants decided.
If you REDEPOSIT:
Both players of Bank II: KEEP
Counterpart KEEP Counterpart WITHDRAW Counterpart REDEPOSIT
You get 210 ECU
In this case, an assumption made by Bank I (only automaton withdraws) DOES hold,
thus if you redeposit, you will get as promised 210 ECU.
One player of Bank II: KEEP another WITHDRAW
In this case, the assumption made by Bank I (only automaton withdraws) DOES NOT
hold - two depositors withdraw (automaton and one more), so Bank II has to take 300
ECU out of the project, which is all the money invested. Thus, if you redeposit, your
money is invested in the additional project and the return: 210 ECU is shared among
you and the player of Bank II who keeps. So, each of you gets 105 ECU. Keep in mind
that if not only you but also your counterpart will redeposit to Bank II, 420 ECU will be
shared among you, your counterpart and the player of Bank II who keeps.
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Counterpart KEEP Counterpart WITHDRAW Counterpart REDEPOSIT
You get 105 ECU 105 ECU 140 ECU
Both players of Bank II: WITHDRAW
Counterpart KEEP Counterpart WITHDRAW Counterpart REDEPOSIT
You get 0 ECU 105 ECU
In this case, the assumption made by Bank I (only automaton withdraws) DOES NOT
hold - three depositors withdraw, so Bank II needs 450 ECU to pay all of them. Thus,
it will take all 300 ECU out of the project and will use your money (150 ECU). Thus,
nothing will be left and you will get 0 ECU at the end. Keep in mind that if not only
you but also your counterpart will redeposit to Bank II, 150 ECU will be left after all the
withdrawals and invested in the additional project. In the end, 210 ECU will be shared
among you and your counterpart thus you will get 105 ECU.
Player of Bank II:
You and your counterpart will be asked whether you want to KEEP your money in a
Bank II or to WITHDRAW it.
Remember that the automaton always withdraws the money.
Your payoff depends on what your counterpart (another player of Bank II: Player V) does:
KEEP or WITHDRAW; as well as on whether players of Bank I REDEPOSIT the money
to Bank II or not.
If you KEEP:
And NO ONE redeposit:
Counterpart KEEP Counterpart WITHDRAW
You get 210 ECU 0 ECU
If your counterpart keeps, the assumption of the bank that only automaton withdraws
holds and you get as promised 210 ECU. If your counterpart withdraws, the bank needs
all 300 ECU to pay two withdrawers, so you get 0 ECU.
If you WITHDRAW:
And NO ONE redeposit:
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Position Counterpart KEEP Counterpart WITHDRAW
You get if 1st: 150 ECU 150 ECU
You get if 2nd:
You get if 3rd: - 0 ECU
If your counterpart keeps, you and automaton withdraws, you will get 150 ECU anyway,
as far as the bank has money for two withdrawers. If your counterpart withdraws, only
the first two will get 150 ECU, the third will get 0 ECU.
Keep in mind that your position in the “queue” will be defined randomly after
both participants decided.
If you KEEP:
And ONE redeposit:
Counterpart KEEP Counterpart WITHDRAW
You get 210 ECU 105 ECU
If your counterpart keeps, the assumption of the bank that only automaton withdraws
holds and you get as promised 210 ECU. If your counterpart withdraws, the bank still
has the money that was redeposited. It is invested and at the end of the period 210 ECU
the is shared among redepositor and you, so each get 105 ECU.
If you WITHDRAW:
And ONE redeposit:
Position Counterpart KEEP Counterpart WITHDRAW
You get if 1st: 150 ECU 150 ECU
You get if 2nd:
You get if 3rd: -
When one player redeposits to Bank I, it can survive up to 3 withdrawals (300 ECU+150
ECU). Thus if you withdraw, you get 150 ECU anyway.
If you KEEP:
And TWO redeposit:
If your counterpart keeps, the assumption of the bank that only automaton withdraws
holds and you get as promised 210 ECU. If your counterpart withdraws, the bank has the
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Counterpart KEEP Counterpart WITHDRAW
You get 210 ECU 140 ECU
money of two redepositors that give 420 ECU which is shared among 3 players (you and
two redepositors). So, you get 140 ECU.
If you WITHDRAW:
And TWO redeposit:
Position Counterpart KEEP Counterpart WITHDRAW
You get if 1st: 150 ECU 150 ECU
You get if 2nd:
You get if 3rd: -
When two players redeposit to Bank I, it can survive up to 4 withdrawals (300 ECU+300
ECU). Thus, if you withdraw, you get 150 ECU independently of what your counterpart
is doing.
Figure 8: Decision screen
Feedback
After both players decided, you will be provided with a short statistic for the game(s)
played. The game will be played 21 times (rounds). The first time will be a TRIAL, so
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will NOT influence your final payoff, whereas all others may influence your final payoff.
You will know how much have you earned only at the end of the experiment: we will
choose the number randomly from 1 to 20 which will tell us the payoff of which round of
the game will be used for your final payment calculation.
Questionnaire
After you finished the game, you will be asked to fill in a small questionnaire regarding
your age, gender and the major of your studies. All the information will be used only for
the current research.
Final payoff
For the calculation of the final payoff, we will consider both what you have earned doing
the first task and the payoff of one round of the game, chosen randomly.
Task I:
If you collected a bomb: Payoff Task I (Euro)=0
If you did not collect a bomb: Payoff Task I (Euro) = Number of boxes collected × 0.1
Task II:
Payoff Task II (Euro) = Payoff of one of the randomly chosen rounds × 0.02
Final:
Show-up fee = 2.5 Euro
Final payoff = Show-up fee + Payoff Task I + Payoff Task II
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1 Introduction
Financial crises have occurred quite regularly over the last 400 years: Kindleberger (2015)
shows that they occur in roughly ten-year intervals. In a study of the International
Monetary Fund, Caprio and Klingebiel (2002) indicate that there were a total of 112
systematic banking crises in 93 countries and 51 borderline crises in 46 countries between
1975 and 1995. Since then, several other banking crises have taken place in other countries,
such as Russia, Argentina and Turkey. In a more recent study, Laeven and Valencia (2013)
show that 147 banking crises occurred between 1970 and 2011. The global financial
crisis of 2007-2009 is just the latest evidence that bank runs remain persistent and are
an important topic worldwide. When bank runs happen, they often entail disastrous
consequences for the whole financial system. Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) argue that
bank runs can be blamed for “twin crises”, meaning that a banking crisis also often causes
a currency crisis. According to Kaufman (1994), a bank contagion can trigger a domino
effect not only in the entire banking system, but even beyond it – in the entire financial
system and the macroeconomy. Bonfim and Kim (2012) calculate that during major
crises from 1970 to 2007, when collective behavior changed the micro-prudential nature
of banking risk into a macro-prudential one, historical total losses for the economy were
13% of GDP and even averaged 20% of GDP (Laeven and Valencia (2013)). Therefore,
most economists such as Fisher (2006), Brown et al. (2016), Rochet (2008), and Boyle
et al. (2015) agree that bank runs have a significant negative influence on the banking
system and the economy as a whole.
We study the withdrawal behavior of bank depositors, focusing on the effect of information
and its exchange through communication on subjects’ decisions. It has been shown both
theoretically (Chwe (2000)) and empirically (Kelly and Gráda (2000)) that information
plays an important role in economic and financial decision-making. Cohen et al. (2008)
claim that social networks may be important mechanisms for information flow into asset
prices. Hong et al. (2004) find that players enter a stock market after observing their
peers participating. Ivković and Weisbenner (2007) conclude that word-of mouth com-
munication between peers leads to an increase in stock purchases. Thus, communication
seems to have a positive impact on financial trading. The conclusion that communication
helps players to coordinate is also supported by the literature on bank runs. Kiss et al.
(2014a) show that a communication node between patient players can help to prevent
bank runs. We contribute to the existing literature by studying the coordination and
communication behavior of subjects in a setting with changing economic conditions. To
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this end, we introduce not only private imperfect information about banks’ fundamentals
but also public information about general economic conditions in order to see how both
types of information influence depositors’ withdrawal behaviors. In a second step, we
allow subjects to exchange information via an anonymous chat window in order to study
whether communication helps to prevent bank runs.
In our model, we try to incorporate the two most common perspectives on bank runs.
The first theory argues that changes in economic fundamentals drive bank runs - Gorton
(1988) states that banking panics are related to the business cycle. Using the liabilities
of failed businesses as a leading economic indicator, he concludes that whenever this
indicator reached a certain threshold, a panic ensued. Zhu (2005) shows that a bank
run is a business-cycle-related and state-related phenomenon; he documents the failure of
the risk-sharing mechanism provided by the banking sector. The opinion that bad bank
fundamentals drive bank runs is shared between Calomiris and Mason (2003), Allen and
Gale (1998), Schumacher (2000), Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008).
The second theory argues that bank runs are the result of a pure panic of individuals.
Saunders andWilson (1996) analyze bank runs during the Great Depression times and find
empirical evidence of depositors withdrawing even from financially stable banks. Also,
Friedman and Schwartz (2008) claim that the run on the Bank of the United States in
1930 was not caused by bad fundamentals. The idea of bank runs being caused by panics
is supported by Kindleberger and O’Keefe (2001), Kelly and Gráda (2000), Brown et al.
(2012).
We do not argue for one theory or the other but highlight the potential importance of
both. We propose a new experimental approach to examine the dynamics of depositor
withdrawal behavior. To this end, we provide subjects with information regarding banks’
fundamentals and, depending on the treatment, we allow them to communicate. We run
two treatments of the experiment: in one of them subjects can communicate via chat in
another - cannot. We compare experimental results with a theoretically optimal behavior
that we find by running a simulation. This approach allows us to learn more about the
withdrawal behavior of depositors in times of crisis: how far is it from being rational as
well as to understand how does it depend on the possibility to communicate.
We choose an experimental approach for two main reasons. On one hand, existing the-
oretical models rely on assumptions that are often not fulfilled in real market situations
and therefore exhibit low external validity.1 On the other hand, there is a lack of ex-
1 Usually, agents do not communicate during the game, thus making any kind of information-sharing
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perimental analysis in the field because the environment of a banking crisis is difficult
to model. We argue that the often-favored model introduced by Diamond and Dybvig
(1983) is not suitable for tackling our research questions, and we propose an alternative
approach as a result.
Summarized, we analyze withdrawal behavior that may lead to bank runs caused by the
(irrational) behavior of depositors (as a result of a coordination game) within a scenario of
worsening economic conditions. Like Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009), we are interested in
seeing how bad fundamentals of a bank change the propensity to withdraw. We study not
only whether depositors withdraw or not, but also analyze how much they withdraw which,
to the best of our knowledge, has been neglected by the literature by now. Also we check
whether communication helps prevent bank runs. We show that the opportunity to chat
decreases withdrawals and is therefore helpful for bank survival in difficult macroeconomic
times. Our third and final contribution is an in-depth analysis of the behavior of subjects
who actually withdraw. Specifically, we analyze how the information provided about the
bank, the level of deposit insurance, and the nationality, gender and the opportunity to
communicate influence individual withdrawal decisions.
In a nutshell, we find that macroeconomic information is not the only factor to influence
withdrawals; communication and coordination also play a big role. In general, communi-
cation helps to slow down withdrawals but is highly dependent on mood: many negative
messages may cause larger individual withdrawals, but positive ones lead to smaller aver-
age withdrawals. Additionally, we find evidence that an increase in the liquidity problems
of a bank and a larger share of uninsured deposits significantly trigger withdrawal behavior
by increasing withdrawal sizes. We also find that women withdraw more often than men
but do so in smaller amounts. Regarding cultural differences, we report first exploratory
results that Russians withdraw higher amounts but do so less often than Germans.
2 Literature review
The common theoretical model used to examine the dynamics of bank runs even when
the bank is not in financial turbulence was introduced by Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
To be more concise, we will use abbreviation "the DD model" from this point on. In
this two-period game, depositors decide whether or not to withdraw money from a bank.
There are only two types of economic agents: those who prefer to consume (spend their
impossible. Additionally, depositors are allowed to withdraw only a fixed number of times, generally
once and simultaneously with other players.
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money) in the first period and those who are willing to wait until the second period to
consume. In this setting, it is important that economic agents do not know to which
“type” of consumers they belong until Period 1. In the case of a panic, a bank can absorb
only a limited amount of withdrawals before it becomes insolvent. One finding of the
model is that bank runs can occur even if it is known that there are no problems with the
fundamentals of the bank. The model by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is applied by the
majority of researchers in the field2 because it has many advantages, such as simplicity,
clear mathematical reasoning, and optimal solutions. According to our knowledge, there
are now more than 20 mainly theoretical, published modifications of the model, although
most of the aforementioned features remain.
We propose an alternative model with another goal. The experimental approach presented
aims at greater external validity. While we must sacrifice a precise theoretical solution, in
exchange, we offer a simulation with rational agents as a theoretically motivated bench-
mark, which allows us to measure deviations from purely rational behavior and examine
the influence of our treatment conditions. The following reviews the literature on influ-
encing factors that we consider important for the setup of our experiment.
2.1 Communication
Communication plays a crucial role in decision-making. Cason et al. (2014) analyze how
repetition and communication may facilitate coordinated resistance in deterring divide-
and-conquer games. They find that is it more effective to communicate than to observe
the history of past resistance. Cooper et al. (1992) study two-way preplay communication
and find that this communication helps to overcome the coordination failures observed in
the game without communication.
The form of communication has an effect on its efficiency. Bochet et al. (2006) study
three forms of communication and find that verbal communication through a computer
chat room substantially increases cooperation and efficiency. In contrast, communication
by sending numerical messages has no significant influence on efficiency.
A bank’s depositors usually communicate verbally or with the help of social networks.
The influence of social networks on the speed of panics spreading among depositors is a
rather new point of investigation. Iyer and Puri (2012) show that if other people in a
depositor’s network run, the depositor himself is more likely to run. Kiss et al. (2014a)
develop an environment to investigate whether the connection to network nodes helps to
2 See Green and Lin (2003), Cavalcanti (2010), Gu (2011), Cañón and Margaretic (2014).
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prevent bank runs. They find that if patient depositors are connected through the node,
the probability of a bank run decreases. The pure existence of the node is not sufficient,
but observing other subjects’ actions determines depositors’ behavior.
In our experiment, we allow subjects to communicate in a chat treatment. One novelty
of our setup is that subjects may communicate whenever they want during each of the
periods; thus, they can talk both before and after making a decision. This setup allows
us to consider both pre-play and after-play communication during bank runs. In contrast
to Kiss et al. (2014a), subjects are not restricted to observing decisions of a specific
counterpart but are allowed to chat with whomever they want and to exchange information
of any kind. This setup gives complete freedom to the subjects to better replicate the
communication process in reality.3
2.2 Gender and Culture
There is a great deal of evidence that gender differences affect financial decision-making.
According to Kagel et al. (2016), gender differences while significant are sometimes small,
but there are cases when even small differences may result in significant effects. Risk
attitudes are empirically found to vary across genders: Gneezy and Potters (1997), Char-
ness and Gneezy (2010). Also, the experimental literature on gender differences shows
clear evidence that women are more risk-averse than men (Croson and Gneezy (2009),
Bertrand (2011)).4 Consequently, men and women behave differently when making risky
investment decisions (Dwyer et al. (2002), Felton et al. (2003), Martenson (2008)). As far
as withdrawal behavior is directly related to the propensity toward risk, an interesting
question is whether one’s decision to keep or to withdraw a deposit depends on gender.
Kelly and Gráda (2000) analyze whether men or women are affected more by the panic
on financial markets by studying two bank runs in New York in 1854 and 1857. They
find that gender did not play a crucial role in explaining panic behavior. The same con-
clusion is reached by Kiss et al. (2014b). Although there is no evidence of gender being
an important driver of withdrawal behavior in the existing experimental literature, we
are still interested in analyzing gender effects. We argue that the level of risk aversion
is a potential factor influencing withdrawal behavior; therefore, due to different risk at-
titudes among men and women, we believe that male and female depositors may behave
differently.
3 The assumption of a complete network is sometimes not fulfilled in reality.
4 Although this finding seems very robust in the financial literature, there is also some current studies
like Filippin and Crosetto (2016) and Kagel et al. (2016) doubting it’s generality.
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Additionally, there is a great deal of evidence that culture influences individuals’ economic
behavior. Guiso et al. (2006) claim that cultural variables are essential for understanding
cross-country differences in national savings rates. Henrich et al. (2001) state that the
degree of market integration can vary between societies. Research on the influence of
different cultures on bank runs is scarce. For the same two panics in the 1850s, Kelly and
Gráda (2000) examine the behavior of Irish depositors in a New York bank. As recent
immigrants, their social network was determined largely by their place of origin in Ireland
and where they lived in New York. During both panics, this social network became the
prime determinant of behavior. Iyer and Puri (2012) use unique depositor-level data for
a bank that faced a run and define the ethnicity of all the depositors into Muslims and
Hindus. They find that depositors from the minority community (Muslims) are more
likely to run. Given that there is almost no research in the field, we are interested in
analyzing how cultural differences affect withdrawal behavior.
2.3 Information
The role of information during bank runs is crucial. Two main kinds of information affect
withdrawals: (i) the financial stability of a bank and (ii) knowledge about other clients’
withdrawals. Some models highlight that bank runs may be caused by depositors’ beliefs
about the solvency of their banks rather than beliefs about the actions of other depositors
(Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), Calomiris and Mason (2003)). Others state that infor-
mation about withdrawal behavior is essential: during times of economic instability and
uncertainty, depositors are quite sensitive to the decisions of other clients (Chakravarty
et al. (2014)). Brown et al. (2016) claim that players’ fundamentals and behavior are
influential and thus need to be considered together. They experimentally study the role
of information during bank runs, finding that withdrawals are contagious when depositors
know that there are economic linkages between banks.
We follow the ideas of Brown et al. (2016) making subjects (imperfectly) aware of the
financial state of a bank at any time. During our experiment, subjects can see on the screen
an indicator (the Default Score), which reflects the bank’s distance from bankruptcy. The
indicator worsens when the bank’s fundamentals worsen and when subjects withdraw
money. Thus, without communication subjects face an uncertainty regarding the behavior
of other depositor which mimics real-life situation and goes hand in hand with the study of
Garratt and Keister (2009). As the Default Score changes in real time, a subject may have
an idea whether others are withdrawing or not. In this way, we allow other depositors’
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Default Scores and behavior to be influential for withdrawal decisions. We conduct two
treatments of the game: one with and one without a possibility to communicate. When
subjects can communicate, they may not only guess that withdrawals are happening but
also even find out how many depositors withdraw.
Additionally, whether information is public or private has an important role in withdrawal
behavior. Indeed, it is still unclear how the privacy of information influences bank runs.
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) claim that when depositors do not have common knowledge
about fundamentals, there is a unique Bayesian equilibrium in which a bank run occurs if
and only if the fundamentals are below some critical value. On the other hand, Heinemann
et al. (2004), who study global games, do not find evidence that an equilibrium becomes
unique in coordination games with several equilibria if some information regarding payoff
functions becomes private. They observe only small differences between sessions with
common and private information. He and Manela (2016) find that depositors with less
informative signals often wait before running. They claim that the public provision of
solvency information helps to prevent bank runs. The timing of the public release of
information regarding solvency is important, especially when a bank will be bailed out.
Wang (2013) finds that before the announcement, the possibility of a bank being bailed
out reduces investors’ withdrawal incentives; however, after the announcement, investors
may withdraw even more extensively. Overall, the influence of information becoming
public or remaining private is a key question with regard to bank runs.
We acknowledge the importance of these approaches, and although it is not our main
focus, we introduce imperfect private information about bank fundamentals (the Default
Score) and public information about general economic conditions into our setup. To this
end, every subject is provided with an estimate of the Default Score, which may deviate
from the actual Default Score of the bank. Therefore, each subject has some (potentially
noisy) information regarding the bank’s stability (He and Manela (2016)). Additionally,
subjects are given the same general information about the state of the economy. As a
result, our setup will generally allow us to analyze how imperfect private information and
perfect public information are used.
2.4 Types of Agents
As in the DD model, Temzelides (1997), Green and Lin (2000), Zhu (2005), Ennis and
Keister (2009), Gu (2011), Smith and Shubik (2014) assume that there are only two types
of economic agents: “patient” and “impatient”. Impatient depositors always withdraw
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early, whereas patient ones choose in the moment whether they stay with a bank till
the end or withdraw early. This assumption limits external validity because people often
behave heterogeneously and, even more importantly, not necessarily in a time-consistent
way. Sometimes, they are consistent and patient, while other times, they are impulsive and
impatient. Azrieli and Peck (2012) show that with a continuum of agent types (between
patient and impatient types), socially efficient outcomes cannot be achieved, underlining
the possible influence of the type assumption. In the current experiment, we do not
prescribe any types to the subjects.5Because there are no pre-defined impatient subjects,
the coordination problem in our experiment is different from the one in the DD model.
In their setup, a subject does not know whether a patient depositor withdraws (and then,
it is possibly a bank run, and he should run as well) or if it is an impatient player and
he should not worry. In our setup, there are no pre-defined impatient subjects, which
is a different decision situation. The "type" of the other subjects, as well as how many
are more or less patient, is unknown, which increases uncertainty. In our experiment,
subjects observe the DS
in real time, which is an indicator for both the macroeconomic situation and the amount
of withdrawals of other subjects. For one subject, it is hard to figure out (at least in
non-chat sessions) whether other people withdraw or banks’ fundamentals worsen at the
beginning of the period. However, not pre-defining types allows us to claim that subjects’
decision-making is not exogenously restricted.
2.5 Deposit Insurance
The DD model has two versions: one with and one without deposit insurance, emphasizing
the role of insurance coverage for withdrawal decisions. Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
make clear that deposit insurance is an effective measure to prevent bank runs. Although
theoretically evident, based on the empirical data, the effect of deposit insurance on
withdrawals is controversial. For instance, Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) conclude that
even the minimum coverage of 20-50% can help to slow down bank runs; however, explicit
deposit insurance may lead to the moral hazard problem. Whereas Madies (2006) claim
that partial insurance coverage does not prevent the occurrence of bank runs, full deposit
insurance may help. Kiss et al. (2012) investigate correlation between the observability
5 Arifovic et al. (2013) also do not impose any agent types. Thus, subjects play a coordination game
between themselves without knowing with certainty who will withdraw. The authors do not consider
bad fundamentals to be a reason for a bank run. Compared to Arifovic et al. (2013), we model an
experiment such that not only the moves of other people, but also the fundamentals influence subjects’
choices.
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of the previous decisions of depositors and the amount of insurance coverage that should
be provided in order to prevent bank runs. They find that if decisions are not observable,
higher levels of deposit insurance decrease the probability of bank runs. However, when
decisions are observable, this need not be the case. Overall, there remains no consensus
concerning the amount of deposit insurance coverage that must be provided to prevent
bank runs. For this reason, we implement deposit insurance in our experiment in order
to analyze its effect on withdrawal decisions. Subjects are given different initial deposits,
which allows us to check whether they withdraw more when a larger part of deposit is
above the deposit insurance threshold.
2.6 Simultaneous vs. Sequential Decisions
Another assumption of the DD model mentioned by Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988)
and later researched by Lin (1996) is that depositors are able to act only simultaneously.
Kinateder and Kiss (2014) provide a sequential-move version of the DD model in which
they assume that depositors contact the bank in an exogenously given fixed order to
communicate whether they withdraw or keep money. Both versions neglect the fact that
in reality, people might strategically choose to react to the moves of others, acting both
simultaneously and in sequence. Gu (2011) proposes a theoretical model that corrects for
this issue, allowing players to choose a withdrawal time; however, the author still uses
liquidity types in her analysis.
We believe that time of withdrawal is crucial regarding bank runs. Thus, in our model,
subjects are not obliged to make a decision at the same time or in a specific order:
they choose on their own when they want to make a decision within a 60-second time
interval. Additionally, we allow subjects to make not one (as it is in the DD model) but
several decisions within each experimental period. Subjects can withdraw and bring the
money back to the bank as many times as they want, which is empirically motivated
and theoretically appealing (He and Manela (2016)) and allows us to better replicate
reality within a chosen experimental framework. Besides that, our assumption goes hand
in hand with the latest experimental literature in the field. According to Garratt and
Keister (2009), subjects are more likely to withdraw when given multiple chances to do
so than when presented with a single decision.
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2.7 Summary
We have analyzed the literature to establish several properties that our experimental ap-
proach will have to fulfill. Essential characteristics include that roles are not pre-assigned
to the subjects and that all subjects begin the experiment under equal conditions, which
allows them to behave in their own natural “role”. The bank’s operations follow a very
realistic setting built on a balance sheet perspective. The experimental environment is
repetitive, and subjects have the opportunity to partially observe the decisions of oth-
ers. They also make their choices in a continuous time environment and can act both
simultaneously and in sequence.
We propose an alternative that satisfies all these criteria and differentiates our model
from the DD model. To our knowledge, it will be the first experiment to tackle the ma-
jority of “classical” restrictions. We trade a clear theoretical solution against a simulation
benchmark for the sake of higher external validity. Therefore, we see our approach not
as competing with the DD model, but as complementing it. We expect that withdrawal
behavior in times of crisis is not always purely rational because people behave emotion-
ally or even driven by panic. Our proposed model is a starting point for supplementary
research that aims to find and observe deviations of real-world behavior from theoretically
expected behavior.
To this end, we attempt to shed light on the following main questions: (1) Do subjects
withdraw on a rational basis during difficult macroeconomic times? (2) Does the pos-
sibility to directly communicate via chat influence withdrawal behavior? (3) Can the
behavior of depositors during bank runs be explained by their personal characteristics,
such as gender and cultural differences, or by the amount of the deposit that is insured?
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 3, we describe and explain
our experimental approach, and in Section 4, we formulate the hypotheses that we want
to test in the experiment. The results are presented in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
3 Methodology
3.1 General Description of the Experiment
We propose a new approach with a very realistic bank setup, which naturally comes at
the cost of being rather complex. We therefore describe only the important parts of the
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experiment here and provide more details in the Appendix. We believe that our approach
secures good external validity and sheds light on relevant aspects that have yet to be
researched. The experiment consists of a bank and its depositors. The bank is automated
and has the main objective of making profits by making investments, providing loans,
and using deposits. Depositors are interested in earning as much interest as possible by
keeping money in a bank account. We examine the withdrawal behavior of depositors
while the economic situation of the bank worsens. The economic situation changes in an
identical way across all the sessions and treatments. If depositors start to panic and run,
the bank might default.
3.2 The Bank’s Operations
The bank performs active and passive operations. As assets, the bank holds cash, short-
term loans, long-term loans, investments in government debt securities, investments in
corporate debt securities, property, and other assets. The liabilities side of the bank’s
balance sheet consists of deposits to clients and equity capital.
We have deliberately chosen this arguably complex balance sheet with multiple types of
assets. Instead of making artificial assumptions and introducing an artificial solvency
path, we decided to concentrate on external validity and mirror the real world and (i)
propose a model for bank runs that can be used in the future to research other influencing
factors, such as changes in regulation. (ii) Without such a sophisticated approach, we
would also have a problem in terms of defining when a bank is insolvent and therefore
defaults. We use the approach of the Bank for International Settlements, which defines
in Basel III that a Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) of 100% is the minimum requirement
for a bank to be seen as solvent.
The likely most important feature for this study is that (iii) the solvency of the bank
is highly influenced by the structure of the bank’s assets and liabilities and by the way
the liquidity ratio is calculated. Therefore, the solvency of a bank in times of crisis is
not linear but highly dependent on the quality of liquidity of the assets currently held on
the balance sheet. Hence, initial withdrawals do not harm the bank too much, but once
the bank has to sell assets at a discount (because of lower market liquidity), the bank’s
financial situation worsens rapidly. This situation is a key problem banks face in real
life. Additionally, our measure of default, the LCR, which we will present next, can be
calculated only with the respective balance sheet details.6
6 See Appendix I for details on the balance sheet.
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3.3 The Liquidity Coverage Ratio as a Measure of Default
A default in our experiment is a consequence of a liquidity shortage;7 for this, we apply
the LCR as a main indicator of the bank’s current solvency. LCR measures whether the
bank has enough liquidity to cover its possible cash outflows, which may occur within the
next 30 calendar days. According to The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, LCR
must be calculated as follows:
LCR =
Stock of High-Quality Liquid Assets
Total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days
(1)
As the LCR increases, the bank has to hold more liquidity to cover potential cash outflows
and vice versa. Next, a new variable called the Default Score (DS) is created. Table 1
displays the relationship regarding how the DS is directly linked to the LCR values.
During the experiment, all subjects can see the current DS on their screens in real time,
allowing them to react to its changes immediately. It is important to note here that every
subject sees his own estimation of the DS, which is similar to the real DS most of the
time, but might be one number too high or one number too low at times that mirror noisy
signals in the real world. The DS is an aggregate signal of the bank’s current liquidity
situation.
Table 1: The relationship between the Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Default Score
LCR DS
LCR > 3.4 1
2.9 6 LCR < 3.4 2
2.2 6 LCR < 2.9 3
1.8 6 LCR < 2.2 4
1.4 6 LCR < 1.8 5
1.2 6 LCR < 1.4 6
1 6 LCR < 1.2 7
LCR < 1 8
Each of the subjects has a deposit that is kept in a bank, and every subject may decide
whether to leave money in a bank account or to withdraw. The following section sheds
light on the bank functioning in the intertemporal environment of the experiment.
7 In real life, the bank could contact the central bank as a lender of last resort. We do not include this
possibility in our approach.
65
3.4 Bank Functioning in the Intertemporal Setting
Each period differs from the previous one because macroeconomic changes take place
between each of the periods. On one hand, these changes are reflected in the macroeco-
nomic variables provided to the subjects. Subjects can see the economic changes occurring
through the dynamics of inflation and unemployment. On the other hand, macroeconomic
changes influence the calculation of the High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA). We imple-
ment the scenario of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 by creating an economic factor
from 0.1 to 0.7, in accordance with the stage of the crisis (see Table 2)8. In every period,
the amount of HQLA is multiplied by this factor, thus reducing the stock of HQLA. As the
economy drifts towards a recession, the factor becomes larger. Consequently, the bank
can pay to fewer depositors in case they withdraw. The implementation of this factor
incorporates market and credit risks alongside the liquidity risk.9
Table 2: Economic situation across periods
Period Economic Factor
1 0.1
2 0.15
3-4 0.2
5 0.3
6-7 0.4
8 0.5
9-10 0.3
11-12 0.4
13-15 0.7
The dynamics of the crisis are also reflected in changes in interest rates: interest rates
on short-term and long-term loans, on government debt securities, and on deposits were
adjusted to their historical values. Although the values of interest rates do not fully
coincide with the corresponding historical values, their dynamics are the same as they
were from August 2008 to September 200910. We have chosen this period because the
8 We have created stages of the crisis based on the report by BIS (2009). Considering the period of
time from July 2007 till May 2009 on a monthly basis, the authors define five of the financial crisis.
The definition of stages is based on the values of GDP, inflation rate, unemployment rate etc. We use
the same description of the stages for the experiment assuming that every experimental period has a
length of one month and set the value of the economic factor correspondingly to the stage of the crisis.
9 The subjects do not know this process precisely but know that the bank has more liquidity problems
when macroeconomic conditions are poor.
10 The historical values of interest rates on deposits, short-term loans, long-term loans and government
debt securities were taken from the webpage of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment. All the values are taken as averages for the euro area countries. For details, please see:
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crisis reached its peak during this time, and therefore, subjects would be most prone to
run.
3.5 Details of the Experimental Implementation
The experiment consists of 15 periods (or less in the case of default). To avoid endgame
effects, subjects are told that the experiment stops randomly between periods 12 and
17. Each period begins with an information screen, on which information concerning
the economic situation in the upcoming period is displayed.11 Each subject is provided
with the same information about the expected rate of inflation and the expected rate
of unemployment in the economy and their historical values as “external indicators” of
the macroeconomic situation. Additionally, news concerning the situation in the banking
sector and in the stock market is provided.
We ensure that the subjects understand the link between the macroeconomic situation
and the solvency of the bank by (i) stating in the instructions that the economic factors
“influence the bank in a way that it loses liquidity and may run into financial troubles”
and (ii) stating above that the bank then might not be solvent enough to cover all of its
obligations, (iii) providing them with the inflation rate and unemployment, which should
give them real-life intuition behind the economic factor, and (iv) provide them with the
written economic forecast, which, e.g., says “As a result losses occur causing banks to
have liquidity shortages”.
The next screen is the decision screen, which shows subjects how much money they cur-
rently have in their accounts, how much money is withdrawn, what amount of their
deposit is insured, and how much interest on deposited and not-deposited amounts they
have earned so far.12 Subjects also observe the current DS in real time, which is individ-
ually derived for every subject and can be equal to, or one number higher or lower than
the actual DS. The subjects are warned that if the real DS reaches “8”, the game will
stop and they will lose all deposited money that is not insured. It is also stated that the
default may occur due to the actions of depositors, because of bad economic conditions,
or a combination of both. Therefore, without communication, it is not possible for a
subject to derive what exactly makes a DS worse: subjects’ withdrawals or the economic
situation. However, by using the chat, subjects can determine what other subjects did
and find out the actual DS by sharing the Default Scores that each observed on the screen.
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=bbn2891
11 See Screen 1 in Appendix III.
12 A calculator is also provided.
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During the period, subjects can do three things: withdraw money, deposit money or
simply wait and do nothing. With the exception of short selling, there are no limitations
on withdrawing and depositing money.13 Interest on deposits is paid proportionally to
the time that money is kept in an account. Interest (constant at 0.1%) earned on not-
deposited money depends on the time the money was not in the bank. At the end of the
experiment, a subject’s payoff depends on the percentage increase in wealth.
There are four treatments in total with four sessions each, and each session includes ten
subjects, for a total of 160 subjects. These subjects differ in terms of the countries in which
the studies are conducted and the availability of chat communication. The experiment
was conducted in Russia, Austria, and Liechtenstein. In Russia, it was conducted at
the National Research University, Higher School of Economics. In the German-speaking
area, most of the experiments were conducted at the laboratory of the Vienna Center
for Experimental Economics, others - at the University of Liechtenstein. The subjects
were all students and had Swiss, German, Austrian or Russian nationalities and different
educational backgrounds. We run a set of 4 markets for each treatment with Russian
subjects and the same set with German-speaking subjects, which allows us to examine
how culture impacts withdrawal behavior. The experiment was implemented in Z-tree
(Fischbacher, 2007), and all sessions were conducted in English. Before the start of the
experiment, subjects could ask clarification questions in private. In general, the task was
properly understood, and subjects raised few questions. The treatments are summarized
in Table 3.14
Table 3: Summary of Treatments
Cul.\Commun. Chat No chat
German German-Chat German-Non-Chat
Russian Russian-Chat Russian-Non-Chat
3.6 Benchmark Simulation
Theoretically, the bank could default in every period in which enough subjects withdraw
a substantial amount of money, or it could never default. The amount that needs to
be withdrawn for a default situation is not constant over time because of the bank’s
additional dependence on the macro-economic situation.
13 See Screen 2 in Appendix III.
14 For detailed instructions, see Appendix III.
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We use simulations to derive the expected period of default for simple rational agents. Our
rational agents follow some simple rules, which we assume to mirror rational behavior: (i)
We assume that subjects have a critical DS (withdrawal score); if the DS15 of the bank
reaches this level, the agent withdraws; (ii) if the agent withdraws, he only withdraws
the uninsured amount of money; (iii) if the decision to withdraw is made, all uninsured
money is withdrawn; and (vi) if the status of the bank improves, a subject re-deposits all
money. We run seven sets of simulations (each set has 100 iterations) altering the level
at which agents withdraw and report the results in Table 4.16
Table 4 presents the results for various levels of the DS. Every column is one simulation
setting. The values in the first line represent the critical DS at which all agents withdraw.
In the second line, the corresponding average periods of the bank’s default are stated.
The value of a critical DS can be interpreted as a measure of overall risk aversion. As an
agent becomes more risk averse, the earlier he will withdraw.
We find that the bank defaults already in Period 1 when the level of withdrawal is set
to 2 (which is a very high level of risk aversion). Looking at the default periods of the
simulation, we observe two things: (i) the bank should either default in period 6 if a
very high risk aversion for all subjects is assumed or in period 13 for reasonable levels of
risk aversion. If withdrawal happens in between, it follows that subjects do not behave
rationally in our definition and withdraw as a result of either panic or poor coordination.
(ii) We see that it is unlikely but possible that the bank never defaults, e.g., subjects
refrain from withdrawing even when a DS of 8 is shown.
We conclude that if (i) subjects behave rationally, (ii) do not try to coordinate their
actions with other subjects and (iii) do not individually panic, the bank should default in
period 13.
Table 4: Simulation results
Withdrawal Score 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Average period of default 1.0 5.1 6.0 13 13 13 –
Naturally, a default happens later as the critical DS increases (or the risk aversion lowers).
At reasonable levels of average risk aversion, the simulation shows that the bank should
always default in period 13. Thus, we have chosen a scenario in which, from period
12 to period 13, the macroeconomic situations change quite strongly and the DS of the
15 Note that presented DS to the agent is not necessarily the real DS but might be one number too high
or one too low, mirroring the exact same decision situation as in the experiment.
16 More details regarding the simulation can be found in Appendix II.
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bank changes to "6" even if no agent withdraws because of the changing macroeconomic
situation alone. Simulations with purely rational agents therefore predict a default in
Period 13.
4 Hypotheses
We have discussed earlier that bank runs are often considered mainly as the result of bad
fundamentals or a coordination failure. We first test if subjects are acting according to
the macroeconomic situation only. If they do, the bank should, as has been shown in
the simulations, always default exactly in period 13, assuming reasonable levels of risk
aversion and rational behavior. If the bank survives longer or shorter than period 13, than
either coordination or irrational panic are also factors influencing withdrawal behavior.
We formulate our first hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis I: Information regarding the state of the economy is the only factor influ-
encing withdrawal behavior. The bank always defaults in Period 13.
In a second step, we add the possibility to actively communicate, which could be of help for
the coordination of depositors. Therefore, with Hypothesis II, we test if communication
between the subjects allows for (better) coordination and lower withdrawals:
Hypothesis II: The possibility to communicate slows down the propagation of a panic:
depositors withdraw less on average, and a bank run happens later or not at all.
Next, we analyze driving factors of subjects who do actually withdraw. To this end,
we consider another subset of data and look into withdrawal/deposit transactions. We
test if (a) the current situation about the liquidity of the bank, (b) the amount of de-
posited money not covered by deposit insurance, (c) gender influences and (d) cultural
backgrounds explain withdrawal behavior. We conduct experiments with gender-mixed
groups in two different regions: Russia and the German-speaking area (Austria and Liecht-
enstein). Only for the reason of brevity, we refer to subjects from that area as "German
subjects" or "Germans". We expect increasing liquidity problems and higher uninsured
deposits to increase withdrawals because they obviously increase risk. It is an often-
observed finding in financial decision making that women behave more risk aversely than
men. We therefore expect them to withdraw more and to do so more often. As far as
cultural differences matter, we apply the widely known theory of Hofstede (2011) who
defines six main dimensions of culture. We will consider one of the dimensions, which
we believe to be applicable, called ’uncertainty avoidance index’, which shows how much
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people try to avoid uncertainty in their daily lives. The score is significantly higher for
Russia (95 out of 100) than for Austria and Germany (51, 65 correspondingly). Thus, we
expect that Russian subjects will withdraw more than German-speaking subjects and be
less trustful of the banking system. We formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis IIIa: Increased liquidity problems of the bank trigger higher withdrawals.
Hypothesis IIIb: The larger is the uninsured part of a deposit, the bigger is a with-
drawal.
Hypothesis IIIc: Women withdraw more and more often than men.
Hypothesis IIId: Russians withdraw more and more often than Germans.
5 Results
5.1 Sample Analysis
The age of subjects lies between 18 and 41, with an average of 23 years. Most of the
subjects (78%) are students specializing in economics/business. The total number of
German subjects (GS) and Russian subjects (RS) is 80 each. More than half of the total
sample (56%) consists of male subjects. German subjects are more balanced with respect
to gender: nearly half of their total number (45%) are men, whereas more than 60%
of Russians (68%) are male (see Table 5). There is no clear evidence that subjects of a
Table 5: Gender distribution of GS and RS sub-samples
Gender GS RS Total Percent
Male 36 54 90 56.25%
Female 44 26 70 43.75%
Total 80 80 160 100%
specific culture or gender significantly outperform others across markets. The final payoffs
vary, although not significantly (see Table 6).17
5.2 Hypothesis I
We analyze whether information regarding the state of the economy is the only factor in-
fluencing withdrawal behavior. Table 7 reports the periods in which banks defaulted for
17 For a balanced comparison of treatments, the payoffs in euro and rubles are adjusted with the pur-
chasing power parity.
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Table 6: Average Final Payouts
Male Female
Average MinimumChat Non-chat Chat Non-chat
GS (Euro) 14.7 15.1 16 13.8 14.9 8
RS (RUB) 477.2 475.6 358 452.0 424.9 180
each market. If hypothesis I were true, we would expect the bank in the no-communication
treatment (Non-chat) to survive until Period 13, assuming reasonable levels of risk aver-
sion. Focusing on the Non-chat column, we see that this is not the case in five out of
eight markets. Thus, we find some evidence that information regarding the state of the
economy is not the only factor influencing withdrawal behavior.
Table 7: Periods in which the bank defaults
Period of default
Culture Chat Non-Chat
RS 13 13
RS 13 12
RS 13 12
RS 13 7
GS no (15) 13
GS 13 13
GS 13 12
GS 14 8
Average 13.38 11.25
The same conclusion can be reached by analyzing the average amount and number of
withdrawals for non-chat sessions.18 As seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2, changes in the
number and size of withdrawals in the non-chat treatment do not usually correspond to
fluctuations of the economic factor. The correlation coefficient between the number of
withdrawals and the value of the economic factor is 0.07. The average size of withdrawals
is related to the value of the economic factor only in first half of the game (0.79). Starting
from Period 9, the correlation between these two indicators becomes negative and much
lower (-0.18). These findings provide additional evidence that subjects’ withdrawals are
not caused solely by fundamentals. They are also driven by subjects’ expectations of
18 The average number of withdrawals per period per chat/non-chat session is calculated as the total
number of withdrawals in corresponding sessions divided by their number. The average amount of
withdrawals per period per chat/non-chat session is calculated as the sum of all withdrawn amounts in
corresponding sessions divided by the number of sessions. We take into account that sessions ended in
different periods; thus, in our calculation, only sessions that reached a specific period were considered.
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Figure 1: The Average Number of Withdrawals
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Figure 2: The Average Amount of Withdrawals
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others being irrational or by their own irrational behavior. Thus, we reject the first
hypothesis.
Besides that, we analyze the fraction of panic-driven withdrawals. We assume that ab-
normal withdrawals are such that a subject withdraws even parts of the deposit that
are protected by deposit insurance, which is not rational, independent of the bank’s fun-
damentals. We calculate the fraction of abnormal withdrawals in the total number of
withdrawals and take it as a proxy of irrational behavior. Figure 3 shows that, after
Period 10 there is a large growth in the fraction of abnormal withdrawals: it is 0.18 on
average before Period 11, but significantly larger (0.27) for the remaining periods.19 All
these findings are an additional evidence that the economy is not the only factor influ-
encing withdrawal behavior; this behavior is also driven by panics or poor coordination
among depositors. It shows that panic bank runs exist, which goes hand in hand with
the results of (Kiss et al. (2018)), who claim that panic bank runs may occur even in the
absence of problems with fundamentals.
Figure 3: The Fraction of Abnormal Withdrawals
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Result I: We find that not only fundamentals, but also panicking influences withdrawal
decisions. The fraction of panic-driven withdrawals increases when economic conditions
get worse.
19 We check it with the help of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The result is significant at 5% level.
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5.3 Hypothesis II
Looking at Table 7 again, we find that in sessions with the possibility of communication,
the bank survives longer20 on average, even for more than 13 periods. As shown in Figure
2, the largest withdrawals for non-chat sessions happen in Period 12, whereas for chat
sessions, the largest withdrawals occur in Period 13, which explains why in the non-chat
treatment, the bank defaults earlier. We conclude that not only the macroeconomic
situation but also the coordination between subjects influences withdrawal behavior. In
non-chat sessions, the average number and amount of withdrawals are always not less
than those in chat sessions (see Figure 1, Figure 2). Thus, communication seems to have
a positive influence, causing fewer withdrawals and runs.
An alternative explanation could be that chat treatments may have fewer withdrawals
– and therefore fewer runs – due to a time constraint, as subjects could be occupied by
typing messages and thus do not have enough time to withdraw. In fact, subjects do
not type that much – around three words on average – and thus, chatting is not time
consuming. Additionally, withdrawing is very easy. Only a few seconds are needed to
type the amount to be withdrawn and to click enter. Thus, we do not believe that time
limitations drive our results.
Result II: The possibility of communication among depositors has a positive effect lead-
ing to fewer withdrawals and runs.
In the following sections, we attempt to analyze how the chat opportunity enhances
coordination. To this end, we will analyze the mood of messages, the ratio of positive to
negative messages and their timing.
5.3.1 Positive and Negative Messages
We investigate whether and how the mood of communication influences withdrawal be-
havior. All messages are grouped into three categories: negative, neutral and positive.
The evaluation has been performed subjectively by the authors by analyzing the chat pro-
tocols.21 For example, a message such as ’There is no reason to withdraw’ is considered
to be positive, whereas a message such as ’I want to withdraw’ is evaluated as negative.
If a message lacks any mood or is not related to the game, such as ’How are you?’, it is
20 The difference is significant, tested with a Mann-Whitney-U-Test at the 5% level.
21 The evaluation has been performed independently by each of the authors and the results were discussed
to avoid any possible disagreements.
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assessed to be neutral. We consider only positive and negative messages for the analysis.
Additionally, these messages are called "early", "mid" and "late" depending on whether
they happen in the first, second or third 20-second intervals, respectively.
Table 8 shows that subjects send more positive than negative messages during the exper-
iment, with the number of positive messages being two times greater on average than the
number of negative messages. German subjects are more active and chat approximately
80% more than Russian subjects.
Table 8: Distribution of positive and negative messages with respect to time
GS RS Total GS RS Total
Positive Messages Negative Messages
Early 54 28 82 25 15 40
Mid 44 32 76 27 11 38
Late 30 14 44 19 10 29
Total 128 74 202 71 36 107
We also analyze how the number of positive and negative messages sent in a period
affects withdrawal behavior. There are two ways withdrawals can change. One is the
size (volume) of withdrawals, and the other is the number of withdrawals. We analyze
them while controlling for the average DS per period as a proxy for the bank’s liquidity
status. We formulate the models in Equation 2 with Av. Withdrawal Sizet in one period
t being the dependent variable (Yt). Av. Withdrawal Size is the sum of all withdrawals
and deposits within a period divided by their number.
Yt = α+β1×Positive_Messagest+β2×Negative_Messagest+β3×DS_Averaget+ut
(2)
,where Positive (Negative)_Messages is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 when the
number of positive (negative) messages in that period is greater or equal to 3 and equal
to 0 otherwise22; DS_Average is the average DS in that period.23
Table 9 reports that having more than 3 positive messages per period leads to lower sized
per period withdrawals than otherwise. The same conclusion does not hold for negative
22 We found that a threshold of 1/2 messages per period is not critical, whereas sending more or less
than 3 messages has an effect on withdrawals.
23 We use clustered standard errors on the period level for all regressions throughout the paper.
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Table 9: The influence of messages on withdrawal behavior
Av. Size of Withdrawal
Constant −9.142
(19.986)
Positive_Messages −39.057∗∗
(16.012)
Negative_Messages 6.933
(18.654)
DS_Average 16.023∗
(7.467)
Observations 103
R2 0.208
Adj.R2 0.184
Prob > F 0.003
Note:∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
messages: sending more or less than 3 messages per period does not have a significant
effect on withdrawals. Obviously, chat does more good than harm and therefore helps
depositors to coordinate their actions.
Result III: The possibility to chat allows depositors to coordinate their decisions. The
mood of conversation matters - having more than 3 positive messages per period leads
to lower sized per period withdrawals than otherwise. Although, the same conclusion
doesn’t hold for negative messages.
5.3.2 Message Ratio
Naturally, one would expect that as the ratio of negative to positive messages during a
session increases, the probability of withdrawals or a default increases. Figure 4 plots the
ratio of messages (defined as the total number of negative messages divided by the total
number of positive messages sent within a period) and the economic factor. We find that
once the messages’ ratio approaches one (Period 13), meaning that there are as many
negative as positive messages, 9 of 16 banks run into default (see Table 7).
Thus, we conclude that the mood of conversation predicts withdrawal behavior to some
degree and may be a signal of upcoming withdrawals. However, as we found earlier that
there is no general relationship between negative messages and withdrawals, this finding
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should be treated with caution.
It seems natural that the mood of conversation is potentially related to the economic
conditions. As one can see from Figure 4, subjects are more negative than positive in
their discussions when the economic situation becomes worse. In general, the relative
mood of chatting is quite responsive to changes in the economy: in 8 out of 16 periods
there is a co-movement of the ratio of messages and the economic factor.
Figure 4: The ratio of messages and the economic factor
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Result IV: The mood of communication is sensitive to changes in economic conditions
and may be a signal of upcoming withdrawals: once the ratio of positive to negative
messages approaches one, withdrawals increase sharply.
5.3.3 Messages and Time
Looking again at Table 8, we find that the most chat activity occurs during the first 40
seconds, when subjects discuss information about the current economic conditions, the
current DS and what to do in that period. The fewest messages are sent during the last
20 seconds of a period. This finding is another piece of evidence that subjects evaluate
the situation as a coordination game problem based on the current market conditions.
In Table 10, we report withdrawals in the same logic by grouping them into (i) early
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withdrawals (during the first 20 seconds of the period), (ii) mid withdrawals (between 20
and 40 seconds) and (iii) late withdrawals (after 40 seconds). As you can see, in chat
treatments, people talk mainly at the beginning while they withdraw mainly at the end
of the period. It makes us think that people first discuss (if they can) and decide later on
about withdrawals, although this conclusion seeks additional experimental evidence.
Comparing the frequency of withdrawals for chat and non-chat treatments, we find it to be
much higher for non-chat markets.24 In non-chat treatments a subject withdraws 10 times
per period, whereas in chat treatments it happens only 6 times on average. A tentative
explanation of such behavior is that people face more uncertainty when they do not know
the opinions of others, leading them to overreact when it comes to withdrawals. While
in non-chat treatments, withdrawals are comparable over the first, second, and last 20
seconds, the amount of early withdrawals is much lower than the amount of mid and late
withdrawals in chat treatments. This change in behavior points at the importance of the
coordination aspect. The absence of communication leads to higher levels of uncertainty,
creating more tension in the market as a result. We find no significant difference between
the frequency of withdrawals for German and Russian subjects25, even though German
subjects withdraw money from the bank in the middle of a period, while Russian subjects
withdraw mostly at the end.
Table 10: Distribution of withdrawals with respect to the time of a withdrawal
Chat Non -Chat GS RS Total
Total number of withdrawals
All 277 435 361 351 712
Early 58 122 101 79 180
Mid 95 147 140 102 242
Late 124 166 120 170 290
5.4 Hypotheses III
We analyze how the current economic situation of the bank, the personal characteristics
of a subject and market mood explain the size of withdrawals. To this end, we use OLS
regressions, with the log of withdrawal size, number of withdrawals, number of abnormal
withdrawals as dependent variables. The three dependent variables are each measured on
the deepest level of data available. While the size of one withdrawal can be measured with
24 This conclusion is based on the results of Mann-Whitney-U-test and is significant at 1% level.
25 We make this conclusion based on the results of Mann-Whitney-U-test.
79
one withdrawal as one separate observation, the number of (abnormal) withdrawals can be
measured only on a per-subject per-period level. We formulate two regression equations
– one for the withdrawal size and one for the number of (abnormal) withdrawals:26
Log Withdrawal Sizei = α + β1 × Cur. Default Scorei + β2 × Log Uninsuredi
+ β3 ×Malei + β4 ×Germani + β5 × Chat+ ui (3)
Here, Log Withdrawal Sizei denotes the log of the size of a withdrawal of a subject i, Cur.
Default Score denotes the DS shown to the subject i immediately before the moment of
withdrawal, and Log Uninsuredi denotes the log of the amount of money not covered by
the deposit insurance in a subject’s account immediately before withdrawal. Male and
German are dummy variables that are 1 when a subject is male and German; Chat is a
dummy variable indicating treatments in which chat was allowed.
Num.Ws. (Num.Ab.Ws.)i = α + β1 × Average Default Scorei + β2 ×Malei
+ β3 ×Germani + β4 × Chat+ ui (4)
Here, Num.Ws. (Num.Ab.Ws.) is the count of (abnormal) withdrawals of subject i within
a period, and Average Default Score is the equally weighted arithmetic mean of the Default
Scores during the period. All other variables are equally derived as in Equation 3. The
results for the regressions from Equations 3 and 4 are displayed in Table 11.27
Regarding withdrawal size, we test several models, numbered (1) to (4). When first
looking at model (4), we find that an increase in the DS by “1” leads to an increase of
the size of a withdrawal by roughly 14%. When the amount of deposit not covered by
insurance grows by 1%, withdrawals correspondingly grow by 0.5%. Looking at the other
models and their corresponding R2, we find that the main increase in explanatory power
comes from the amount of money uninsured. It appears that the amount of money at
risk is the main trigger for withdrawals. This finding highlights the importance of strong
deposit insurance systems for system stability. Thus, we cannot reject Hypotheses IIIa
26 We use the same model specification to analyze the number of withdrawals and the number of abnormal
withdrawals
27 We check for correlation between independent variables for all regressions. It is always less than 0.25.
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Table 11: Driving factors of individual withdrawal behavior: all sessions
Dep. Var.: Log Withdrawal Size Num.Ws. Num.Ab.Ws.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 3.378∗∗∗ 0.916∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 1.145∗∗∗ 1.189∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.169) (0.142) (0.195) (0.059) (0.187)
Cur. Default Score 0.087∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.147∗∗ 0.142∗∗
(0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Av. Default Score 0.008 0.040
(0.019) (0.087)
Log Uninsured 0.487∗∗∗ 0.510∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.026) (0.030)
Male 0.337∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ −0.045 −0.326∗∗
(0.083) (0.084) (0.039) (0.101)
German −0.470∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.041) (0.079)
Chat 0.232 0.308∗ 0.312∗ 0.196 −0.126 −0.207
(0.122) (0.114) (0.121) (0.131) (0.047) (0.121)
Observations 712 687 687 687 602 362
R2 0.016 0.179 0.195 0.227 0.054 0.153
Adj.R2 0.013 0.175 0.190 0.221 0.048 0.143
Prob > F 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.005
Note:∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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and IIIb regarding the withdrawal size. Looking at the number of withdrawals, we find
no effect of the DS. We refrain from testing the average amount of money that is not
insured, as this measure does not provide a good proxy for money at risk when averaged.
Table 11 also shows that the size of withdrawals for male subjects is 43% higher than
for females. We find no statistically significant effect on the number of withdrawals.
However, when we simply count the frequency of withdrawals, we find that women on
average withdraw 44% more often than men.28 Besides that, we find that the number of
abnormal withdrawals is lower for men than for women (see Table 11). Thus, there is
some evidence that women withdraw more quickly as well as irrationally but in smaller
amounts, while men tend to wait to make a decision but then withdraw more at one
time. We therefore report mixed evidence regarding Hypothesis IIIc and find that women
withdraw less money but do so more often.
Hypothesis IIId states that Russians withdraw more and more often. Indeed, we find
that the size of withdrawals by Germans is lower than that of Russians. However, looking
at the number of withdrawals, we see that Germans withdraw more often than Russians
and the same holds for the frequency of abnormal withdrawals. Therefore, again, we
report mixed findings that Russians withdraw more money but less often, we find only
partial support for Hypothesis IIId. As far as we do not find clear evidence for one or
another group of subjects withdrawing smaller amounts and less frequently, we suggest
this topic for future research. We believe that policymakers and banks would be interested
in knowing what kind of depositors depletes the liquidity of the bank more slowly.
Result V: The size of withdrawals for male subjects is higher than for females. There
is no evidence of a gender effect on the number of withdrawals. However, women make
abnormal withdrawals more often than men. Besides that, women withdraw more quickly
but in smaller amounts, while men tend to wait to make a decision but then withdraw
more at one time. Russians withdraw more money, but less often then Germans.
6 Conclusion
We use an experiment to analyze the withdrawal behavior of bank depositors during times
of economic crises. We make a strong case for the use of an experimental approach with
higher external validity to analyze withdrawal behavior during times of economic crisis.
The approach we offer allows for strategic behavior and communication and therefore
28 On average, each woman withdraws 5.1 times in a market session and every man 3.6 times.
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increases the set of possible strategic moves (e.g., waiting, reacting to others, contacting
peers, etc.), which are also available in reality. We provide a benchmark simulation to
compare the behavior of the subjects in the experiment to what we believe to be rational
behavior.
In a nutshell, we find that information regarding the state of the economy is not the
only factor to influence withdrawals. Subjects do take the macroeconomic situation into
account, but coordination also plays a big role. In general, communication helps to slow
down withdrawals, much depending on the mood of it. We find no significant evidence
that negative messages may cause higher individual withdrawals, but strong evidence
that many positive ones lead to smaller average withdrawals per period. We show that an
increase in the liquidity problems of a bank (a higher DS) and a larger share of deposits not
secured by deposit insurance trigger withdrawal behavior by increasing withdrawal sizes.
We conclude that deposit insurance is a powerful instrument to decrease withdrawals
in times of crisis. Interestingly, women make (abnormal) withdrawals more often than
men but withdraw smaller amounts. Regarding cultural differences, we can report only
preliminary exploratory results. We find that Russians withdraw higher amounts but less
often than Germans.
Our analysis contributes to the understanding of withdrawal behavior, but further research
is needed. We believe it is important to study how cognitive and cultural characteristics
of depositors trigger withdrawals to understand what type of depositors depletes the
liquidity of a bank more slowly.
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Appendix I - Experimental settings
The Balance Sheet of the Bank
Liabilities: Focusing on the liabilities first, we distinguish between deposits into subjects’
deposits and other deposits. Only subjects’ deposits are controlled by the subjects of the
experiment. Other deposits are (virtual) loyal depositors of the bank, are not under
subjects’ control, and can therefore not be withdrawn by subjects. This information is
needed to balance the experiment by decreasing the influence of a single depositor on the
solvency of the bank. The capital of the bank consists of common shares and retained
earnings. The amount of the bank’s capital is based on existing Basel III regulations
(Cournede and Slovik, 2011), and the 2015 amount of common equity must be set at a
minimum level of 4.5% of all risk-weighted assets, while the amount of total capital should
be at least 8% of all risk-weighted assets.
Assets: According to the Banking Commission on Basel Supervision (BCBS), there are
two main approaches for the calculation of assets weighted with risk: the standardized
approach (SA) and the internal rating-based approach (IRB approach). SA uses external
credit ratings to define risk-weights for each of the asset classes, whereas IRB is based
on a bank’s own estimations. Each calculation method of risk-weighted assets has its
advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, the IRB approach has a good level of
sensitivity, allowing the necessary amount of capital to be calculated more precisely. On
the other hand, the implementation of the IRB approach is potentially difficult because
the method assumes the availability of sufficient historical data to make estimations. We
calculate risk-weighted assets based on the various credit risk parameters of the IRB
approach and the SA. The risk-weights for the assets of the bank are shown in Table 12.
Table 12: Risk weights for different asset classes
Asset Risk-weight (%)
Cash 0
Short-term loans 75
Long-term loans 75
Government Debt Securities 30
Corporate Debt Securities 30
Property and Other Assets 17
Bank Operations During the Experiment: A bank’s balance sheet changes from
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period to period in accordance with its activities. The bank performs the following oper-
ations every period:
• Provides long-term loans: Long-term loans are kept on a bank’s accounts for
longer than one period. At the end of each period, 50% of the received interest is
turned into cash that the bank keeps. The other 50% are paid out to the hypothetical
shareholders of the bank. Thus, the principal amount of long-term loans remains
constant during the experiment.
• Provides short-term loans: Short-term loans have a maturity of one period. At
the end of a period, 50% of the interest gained is kept to be reinvested in short-term
loans in the next period. The bank extends its loans during the game. The other
50% are kept as cash by the bank.
• Invests in government and corporate debt securities: Investments in gov-
ernment and corporate debt securities are done every period. The interest income
gained from these securities is not reinvested but paid out to the hypothetical share-
holders.
• Invests in property and other assets: At the beginning of the game, the bank
already has some real estate. During the game, we assume that there are no op-
erations with these types of assets, so their value remains constant throughout the
experiment.
• Pays dividends to bank shareholders: These are calculated as the sum of
interest earned over the period on all securities and 50% of interest income earned
over the period on long-term and short-term loans.
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Liquidity Coverage Ratio Calculation
The LCR is calculated as follows:
LCR =
Stock of High-Quality Liquid Assets
Total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days
(5)
High-quality liquid assets (HQLA) consists of three main groups: Level 1, Level 2 (A)
and Level 2 (B) assets. Each of the HQLA are weighted with a special factor that defines
how easily an asset can be converted into cash in order to cover losses. Level 1 assets
can be fully transferred into cash. Level 2 (A) assets must be weighted with the factor of
85%, while a maximum 75% and minimum 50% of Level 2 (B) assets can be considered
for LCR calculations. We consider cash to be a Level I asset (Factor: 100%), government
debt securities in which the bank invests as Level 2 (A) (Factor: 85%), and assets and
corporate debt securities as Level 2(B) (Factor: 50%). Taking into account the balance
sheet structure of the bank, the formula for HQLA calculation is
HQLA = Cash + Government Debt Securities · 0.85 + Corporate Debt Securities · 0.5
(6)
All other assets are considered to be the main source of cash inflows. According to BCBS
regulations, double counting is not permitted on LCR, so if an asset is considered part of
the “stock of HQLA,” then it cannot be a source of cash inflows at the same time. The
bank also has cash outflows at the end of every period with the interest payments on
deposits.
All deposits with a maturity of less than 30 days can be divided into three main groups:
stable deposits that meet additional criteria, stable deposits and less stable retail deposits.
The main difference between stable and less stable deposits is that stable deposits are
covered by insurance, whereas less stable deposits are too large to be covered by insurance.
Therefore, if a deposit is larger than the deposit insurance, the part of it that is covered
is considered stable, while the remaining part is unstable. LCR regulations weight them
with specific factors of 5% and 10%, respectively. Unstable deposits are considered more
likely to be withdrawn because they are not covered by insurance and people are more
afraid of losing this part of their money in the case of default. Thus, total net cash outflow
(TNCO) over the next 30 calendar days is calculated as described in Equations 7, 8 and
9:
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Total Cash Inflow over the next 30 calendar days (TCI) = SL · rsl + LL · rll (7)
, where SL is the amount of short-term loans and LL for long-term loans and rsl - monthly
for the interest rate on short-term loans and rll - for long-term loans.
Total Cash Outflow o.t.n. 30 cal. days (TCO) = Stable Part · 0.05 + Unstable Part
· 0.1 +Other Deposits · 0.03 (8)
Total Net Cash Outflow o.t.n. 30 cal. days (TNCO) = TCO−min(TCI; 75% · TCO)
(9)
Some deposits (other deposits) are made by loyal clients and are likely not to be withdrawn
at all. We assume that these deposits are kept in transactional accounts. For this reason,
a percentage of monetary withdrawals will be on the low side:- 3%. These other deposits
do not belong to the subjects and cannot be withdrawn or re-deposited by them. See
Table 13 for a detailed overview of initial deposits.
Table 13: Initial deposited amounts at the beginning of the experiment
Before Withdrawal
Stable Deposit Less Stable Deposit Other Deposits
5% 10% 3%
Deposit 1 200 80 120
Deposit 2 100 80 20
Deposit 3 350 80 270
Deposit 4 300 80 220
Deposit 5 200 80 120
Deposit 6 250 80 170
Deposit 7 300 80 220
Deposit 8 250 80 170
Deposit 9 200 80 120
Deposit 10 250 80 170
Other Deposits 3270 98.11
Interest earnings gained from credit holders are considered cash inflow, whereas interest
payments on deposits are cash outflow. Interest income on securities and cash are HQLA
that play the role of “liquidity buffer” and can be used in the case of liquidity problems.
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Calculating LCR allows an estimation of whether the bank has enough HQLA to meet
its short-term liquidity needs. This information is reflected in the DS that is visible to
subjects during the game.
Procedure to pay out depositors withdrawing deposits: The first asset class used
by the bank to make payments to the depositors is cash. If the bank runs out of cash but
withdrawals continue, it begins to sell Level II assets (first government debt securities,
then corporate debt securities) to meet its obligations. If the amount of HQLA becomes
less than that of TNCO, the bank has reached the point of bankruptcy. At the beginning of
each period, the LCR is recalculated based on the amount of HQLA kept at the respective
moment in time. It is important not only to adjust LCR at the beginning of each period
but also to recalculate all balance sheet items in case some changes had occurred by the
end of the previous period (for instance, accumulation of interest).
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Appendix II - The details of the simulation
The proposed theoretical model has been simulated in MatLab. For each critical Default
Score level, the simulation model has been run 100 times. For the simulation, we assume
that if a player withdraws, he/she withdraws only the part of a deposit that is not covered
by the deposit insurance as far as an insured amount is guaranteed in any case. In
our theoretical model, players have an unlimited number of attempts within a period
to withdraw/re-deposit the money. However, in our simulation, we assume that the
maximum number of attempts is equal to three for several reasons. The first is time
constraints, as it takes time to make a decision. The second reason is that the interest
earned on a deposit becomes negligible if the number of attempts to keep/withdraw grows,
thus making it unreasonable to decide too often. All other assumptions of the model not
mentioned above, and the values of the parameters are kept as they are in the theoretical
model.
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Appendix III - Experimental instructions (translated)
Dear participant!
We would like to warmly welcome you to this experiment. From now on, you are asked not
to speak to anyone except the tutors. If you have a question, please raise your hand and
wait at your seat until a tutor approaches you. Please read carefully all the information
provided below, as it is important for participation in the experiment.
Background information
In the experiment, a bank exists that, on one hand, keeps deposits of clients and, on the
other hand, provides loans and holds securities. You are a depositor at the bank, so you
must decide if you want to deposit money at the bank or not and if you do deposit, how
much. It is your decision whether to keep money or to take it from the bank.
The bank
The bank is controlled by the computer and operates automatically. It receives deposits
from clients and pays interest on these deposits. It also provides short- and long-term
loans to other clients (not you) and invests in government and corporate debt securities,
receiving interest payments for these activities. The bank operates for 12 to 17 periods.
The experiment stops randomly after one of these periods, and all periods (12-17) have
the same probability of being the last one. If the bank fails to meet its obligations to
clients at any point during the experiment, it must default (more on this later). The
decision phase in each period is 60 seconds long.
Actions of the participant
You and all other subjects each hold an account as a depositor at this bank. At the
beginning of the game, all of your money is in the bank account. Your goal is to maximize
your wealth at the end of the experiment. You increase your wealth by earning as much
interest as possible. It is now your decision whether to keep all or part of the money in
the account or to withdraw it from the bank. At the end of each period, you will earn
an interest payment, which is calculated based on the amount deposited, the time that it
was in the account during the period and the current interest rate. In other words, if you
decide to withdraw money from the account during the period, you will earn an interest
payment only at the end of the period proportional to the time you had the money in
the account. The interest rate on your deposits will change from period to period. The
current interest rate will always be provided on the screen. Non-deposited money also
earns a very small, risk-free interest payment proportional to the time this amount was not
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kept in the bank during the period. However, the risk-free interest rate is substantially
lower (i=0.1%) than the initial rate on the deposit. At the end of each period, both
types of interest are added to your deposited money. The more money (deposited and
not-deposited added together) you have at the end of the experiment, the higher your
real payment.
Potential bank default
It is possible that in specific situations, the bank is not solvent enough to cover all of its
obligations. This case is especially true in unfavorable economic situations where many
depositors simultaneously withdraw a lot of money. Therefore, whether the bank defaults
or not depends on the actions of all depositors and on economic factors, which influence
the bank in such a way that it loses liquidity and may run into financial troubles. In this
case, the Default Score (described below) increases. However, as long as the bank does
not default, it will be able to fully pay its obligations, especially the interest payments
on deposits, regardless of how high the Default Score is. If a default occurs, all the
money that is currently deposited is lost, except for some part (max. 80 units of money)
that is insured against bank default. (Note: you can see how much is insured on the
decision screen). Therefore, as long as the bank is still in operation, each depositor earns
the interest payments, but once the bank defaults, you lose the entire amount currently
deposited (!), except for the insured part of it, and the game is over.
The information screen
To reach a decision on how much money you want to deposit, you can use the information
provided to you at the beginning of each period and the information provided during the
period. On the screen below, you can see how the information is provided at the beginning
of each period. You receive information about the current economic situation that the
bank is operating. This situation has an influence on the bank’s assets and therefore
influences the “health” of the bank. Information from the previous periods is repeated in
the lines to provide an overview of economic development.
The decision screen
On this screen, you are provided with several pieces of information and the possibility to
deposit and withdraw money. In each period, this screen is shown for 60 seconds. In the
top window, you can deposit and withdraw money. You can withdraw only the amount
that is left in the deposit account, and you can deposit only money that has not been
deposited yet.
The information provided covers
97
Figure 5: Screen 1 Macroeconomic Information for the upcoming period
Figure 6: Screen 2 Decision Screen
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Interest Rate on Deposits - interest rate on deposits for the current period.
Current Deposited Amount - amount of money kept in the bank at this moment.
Current Non-Deposited Amount - amount that you can still add to the amount in
your account.
Amount Insured - amount that will be returned to you by the bank if it defaults. The
maximum amount insured is 80.
Interest Earned by Now - amount that you have earned in the previously elapsed
periods of the game on the deposited amount of your wealth (in units).
Total Risk-Free Interest - amount that you have earned in the previously elapsed
periods of the game on the non-deposited amount of your wealth (in units)
The Current Default Score - how financially stable the bank is at the current moment
using a number between 1 and 8. As the Default Score increases, the risk that the bank
will not be able to pay back its liabilities increases. If the Default Score is equal to 8, the
bank is already in default or very close to it. Once the bank has defaulted, no additional
transactions will be executed, and the experiment stops at the end of the period.
Important: The default score shown to you is only an estimation of the real situation
of the bank. The estimation is correct most of the time but has a random error with a
mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.5. This figure means that in 65% of all cases,
the estimation is correct. In all other cases, it is either one number too high or one too
low (e.g., 5 or 7 instead of a ’real’ 6). Each subject receives his/her own independent
estimation. During the period, you can withdraw and deposit money as much and as
often as you want.
Communication with other subjects is possible via the chat box. You can see the mes-
sages of all other depositors, and they can see all of yours.29
The end of the game and your final profit (for Russian players)
The game randomly ends between periods 12 and 17 with the same probability or when
the bank defaults. Your payout in rubles will be calculated using the following rule:
400 rubles + (% change in wealth) * 12
% change in wealth = 100 * (FinalWealth - InitialWealth) / InitialWealth
where:
Final Wealth = Deposited money and non-deposited money at the end of the experiment,
29 Communication was possible only in chat treatments. The instructions of non-chat treatments made
clear that any kind of communication is forbidden.
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including all interest payments
or in the case of bank default:
Final Wealth = Deposited insured money and non-deposited money at the end of the
experiment
The minimum payment is 180 rubles.
Example 1: Initial Wealth was 100. At the end, the Final Wealth is 114 % change in
wealth = 100 * (115 - 100) / 100 = +15%
Payment = 400 rubles + 12*15= 580 rubles
Example 2: Initial Wealth was 100. At the end, the Final Wealth is 95 % change in
wealth = 100 * (95 - 100) / 100 = -5%
Payment = 400 rubles - 12*5 = 340 rubles
The final profit (for German players)
Your payout in euros will be calculated using the following rules:
15 Euro + (% change in wealth) / 3.5
% change in wealth = 100 * (FinalWealth - InitialWealth) / InitialWealth
where:
Final Wealth = Deposited money and non-deposited money at the end of the experiment,
including all interest payments
or in case of bank default:
Final Wealth = Deposited insured money and non-deposited money at the end of the
experiment
The minimum payment is 8 euros.
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Abstract
We analyze how people’s saving decisions vary across three different pension sys-
tems and income profiles. In the first pension system there is no mechanism to
save, subjects make "pocket savings" and use them whenever they want. In the
second system, subjects are forced to save 10% of their income in every period and
still can make pocket savings. In in addition to that, in the third system people
can make voluntary savings that cannot be spent before retirement. Theoretically,
saving alternatives should not influence the amount saved, however we observe that
voluntary saving option makes subjects to save more. We do not find any evidence
that obligatory contributions, as well as stochasticity of income cause larger savings,
although subjects use different "rules of thumb" depending on whether the future
income is known or unknown. Better cognitive abilities lead to better performance
in a saving task, whereas risk aversion does not seem to have a significant effect.
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1 Introduction
In most countries, the expected number of years that individuals will spend in retirement
is still on the rise (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2008). This demographic change leads to an
increase in the old-age dependency ratio, which is commonly defined as the ratio of the
number of persons aged 65+ to those aged 20–64. The old-age dependency ratio is an
important factor for the viability of pay-as-you-go pension systems, and is rising sharply
in many countries. For the EU, Eichhorst et al. (2011) forecast an increase in this ratio
from 25% in 2007 to 50% in 2050.
At the same time, people save too little for the retirement (Hurd et al., 2012; Poterba
et al., 2012). There are several reasons for that. First, people over-consume at early
stages of their lives (Miron, 2001; Duffy and Li, 2016), which prevents them from starting
to save early enough. This behavior has been described as "myopic" or "inattentive"
(Lusardi, 1999; Reis, 2006; DeVaney et al., 2007). Besides that, subjects may lack the
necessary willpower, postponing an unpleasant activity like saving (Thaler, 1994; Harris
and Laibson, 2001). In addition, cognitive abilities may play a role as optimal saving over
the lifetime is a complicated decision-making process (Ballinger et al., 2011). Last but
not least, subjects may have dynamically inconsistent preferences (Brown et al., 2009).
The increasing age of population together with insufficient personal savings may threaten
the sustainability of pension systems in the long run (Fatás et al., 2013). Thus, it is
essential to understand what motivates people to save more for the retirement as well as
to make them think about their own saving decisions (Tam and Dholakia, 2011).
In this paper, we analyze how people’s saving decisions vary across different pension
systems (with one, two or three saving options). According to Wärneryd (1996), the
action of saving is usually passive. At the same time, the "default" arrangements for
pension plan participation may have relatively large effects on saving behavior (Card and
Ransom, 2011). For instance, Choi et al. (2004) and Carroll et al. (2009) find that savings
under "default" plans are significantly lower compared to the case when an employee has
to make an "active decision" regarding his savings.1
Our primary goal is to find what kind of pension system structure provides the best
incentives for subjects to "actively" save for their retirement. We contribute to the scarce
experimental literature by testing the effect of different pension system structures on
1 By "default" plans we mean that employees are automatically prescribed a pension plan and do not
decide on its features. Thus, they do not actively choose but rather passively accept the pension plan
features.
102
saving behavior. As a benchmark, we use the optimal consumption path that we find
within a theoretical model of life-cycle saving and consumption. We check whether the
behavior observed in the lab is close to the optimal one.
The theoretical model design is based on recent empirical results regarding economic be-
havior (Marshall, 2005; Brown et al., 2009), which differs from the classical setup in several
ways (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954). First, the proposed utility function depends not
only on current consumption but also on how much a subject consumed in the past - his
level of habit. Besides that, habits are modeled to grow in a non-linear manner. Using
dynamic optimization, we derive optimal consumption paths for decisions under income
certainty and uncertainty. Then, we conduct an experiment to see what kind of saving
mechanism (mandatory, voluntary, or their combination) incentivise people to save more
for the retirement. In addition, we examine the effect of income stochasticity on saving
decisions. Last but not the least, we test whether personal characteristics of subjects
such as risk-aversion, gender, and cognitive abilities influence their saving decisions. The
experimental approach allows us to measure the effect of a specific parameter within the
controlled experimental environment (Falk and Fehr, 2003; Hurd et al., 2012; Dufwen-
berg, 2015). This distinguishes our approach from an analysis of empirical data, which
may be affected by spillover effects (Wagner, 2005; Hurd et al., 2012) and cross-country
differences in pension systems (Antolín and Whitehouse, 2009).
In a nutshell, we find that people fail to consume optimally. They spend too much
before retirement, thus do not have sufficient funds to consume after retirement. In
some treatments, subjects tend to consume less in the second than in the first part of
the game. Although saving options’ design should not cause differences in total savings
across systems, we find that people save significantly more when they are provided with
an option to make voluntary contributions. Stochasticity of income does not change the
amount of total savings drastically. When the income is known, subjects tend to use
the "rule of thumb" increasing their savings linearly over time. Whereas when income
is stochastic, they tend to mimic its moves in their saving decisions. Overall, subjects
demonstrate the worst performance in the treatment with only pocket savings. Better
cognitive abilities help them to perform better in the task, whereas risk-attitudes do not
seem to have a significant effect on choices.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we summarize the main literature.
The methodology is explained in Section 3. The experimental design and procedure as
well as the main hypotheses are detailed in Section 4. In Section 5, we report the main
results. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Literature review
One of the key elements of a sustainable pension system is an appropriate mix of three
pension pillars (Eichhorst et al., 2011). The first pillar is usually based on the pay-as-you-
go principle where contributions and taxes of current workers are used to finance pensions
of current pensioners. The second pillar comprises voluntary or mandatory occupational
pension schemes, while the third pillar consists of mostly voluntary contribution plans.
There is no single, empirically-supported conclusion regarding the optimal structure of
a pension system (Orszag and Stiglitz, 2001). According to Advisory Council (1997),
the first pillar serves a useful purpose, which should be salvaged and enhanced, whereas
Cuevas et al. (1997) stress the negative impact of pay-as-you-go systems on national
savings. Feldstein (1997) states that mandatory second-pillar contributions would add to
national savings. Orszag and Stiglitz (2001) mention that the second pillar may not be
an appropriate part of the pension system for many countries. Lately, there has been a
shift towards funded pensions, not only by the increasing emphasis on the second pillar
and the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution schemes, but also by promoting
additional voluntary (third pillar) pension savings (Le Blanc et al., 2011; Holzmann,
2013). Nevertheless, pension policy cannot be universal: "one-fits-all countries" policy
does not exist. It requires a more nuanced approach than implied by a single "optimal"
constellation of pillars (Orszag and Stiglitz, 2001). Understanding what kind of saving
mechanism (mandatory, voluntary, or some combination of both) stimulates people to
save is a key step towards implementation of a successful system. Given that empirical
analysis is not always possible, we study experimentally what kind of saving option(s)
may induce people to save more for retirement.
Literature on experiments investigating saving decisions in simulated financial environ-
ments is scarce (Koehler et al., 2015). Carbone and Duffy (2014), Feltovich and Ejebu
(2014) analyze how consumption choices are influenced by the degree of observability of
peers’ decisions. Ballinger et al. (2003) studies the effect of communication on savings.
Fehr and Zych (1998) and Brown et al. (2009) try to relate insufficient savings to addic-
tions and preferences for immediacy. Carbone and Hey (2004) finds that people’s saving
decisions are highly responsive to the current level of income. Anderhub et al. (2000)
studies how uncertainty regarding life duration influences consumption choices. Hey and
Dardanoni (1988) relates differences in saved amounts with cognitive abilities of subjects.
Fatás et al. (2013) is interested in finding the effect of lump-sum payments on savings.
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To our knowledge, there is only one experimental study by van der Heijden et al. (2015)
that is close to ours. The authors study how the freedom to choose a pension scheme
affects subjects’ saving behavior. There are 4 possible schemes, which differ by the vari-
ability of income: a person can get all the income during the working life or spread it
across the life span. The authors examine whether pension schemes that bring the income
profile closer to the optimal consumption path lead subjects to save more. Although the
authors study an interplay of saving decisions and income streams, they do not relate
assumed streams’ distributions with how the income is allocated in reality.
In our experiment we use a different setup to analyze subjects’ savings. We provide
individuals with the same income paths, but with different saving options. Subjects have
complete freedom to allocate their income between the working and retirement stages of
life. Besides analyzing which option (or their combination) leads to higher savings, we
study the effect of income streams on savings by running two versions of the experiment,
which differ by income streams being either deterministic or stochastic. We study whether
the stochasticity of income influences saving behavior, because existing empirical and
experimental evidence is inconclusive or even contradictory. Most of the literature shows
that people save more in the presence of uncertainty. Skinner (1988), Zeldes (1989),
Gourinchas and Parker (2002) find that when faced with income uncertainty, people
consume less because they feel a higher need to save for retirement. Hahm and Steigerwald
(1999) claim that consumers are forward-looking, gradually adjusting their precautionary
savings to changes in income. In contrast, Fulford (2015) shows that income uncertainty
is not a primary saving motive and does not necessarily drive precautionary savings.
Moreover, estimates of precautionary savings range from 60% (Carroll and Samwick,
1998) to less than 10% (Guiso et al., 1992) of total wealth, casting additional doubt on
any positive correlation between precautionary savings and income uncertainty.
We control for cognitive abilities and risk aversion of subjects because these factors are
well-known to affect savings. According to the literature, risk-averse individuals save
more. Hey and Dardanoni (1988) state that subjects who over-consume and under-save
are mainly risk-lovers. Koehler et al. (2015) claim that more risk-averse participants save
more in response to a lengthening retirement period. Fatás et al. (2013) argue that risk-
averse subjects demonstrate a persistent precautionary saving behavior. Based on the
literature, cognitive abilities play a role in a subject’s performance in a saving task. Hey
and Dardanoni (1988), Ballinger et al. (2003) and Brown et al. (2009) agree on people
being boundedly rational, which prevents them from saving enough. Moreover, Ballinger
et al. (2011) claim that cognitive abilities are the best predictors of saving performance.
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Overall, we study how different pension schemes, as well as stochasticity of income and
personal characteristics of subjects, influence their decisions in saving for retirement. As
a theoretical framework, we use a modified version of a standard additive consumption
model. All the relevant literature related to the model design choices is provided in the
following section.
3 Methodology
Our theoretical framework builds on the standard additive consumption model proposed
by Browning and Lusardi (1996). According to this model, people save during their
working lives to have enough money to spend on consumption after retirement. Subjects
maximize the total utility over the lifetime under the budget constraint. To find the
optimal consumption path, we make the following assumptions. First, we assume that
subjects do not have any inherited assets and there are no cash inflows apart from earnings
during their lives, so any spending has to be financed from these earnings. Second, the
fraction of total income that a person spends on consumption is scale-independent, i.e.,
it is defined only by their preferences and does not depend on the amount of available
income. In this way, we control for the habit formation function and utility function
to be homogeneous such that consumption choices are independent of the income level.
Third, there is no mortality risk, i.e., subjects know exactly for how many years they will
work and live.2 Fourth, we assume zero discount rates to simplify the saving decisions for
subjects, because, as shown experimentally, people fail to consume optimally even in the
absence of utility discounting (Brown et al., 2009; Ballinger et al., 2011).
Despite being based on a well-known consumption and saving model, our framework differs
in two ways. We follow the latest literature on intertemporal consumption (Bowman et al.,
1999; Carroll, 2000; Brown et al., 2009) and assume that: (1) subjects’ utility depends
both on consumption and habit level; (2) the habit level grows non-linearly.
3.1 The Habit Formation Function
Habit plays a crucial role in consumption choices (Fuhrer and Klein, 1998; Marshall,
2005). There is empirical evidence that people tend to adjust their current consumption
depending on past consumption levels. Constantinides (1990) analyzes monthly, quarterly
2 There is almost no theoretical literature on the effect of mortality risk on savings (Yao et al., 2014).
Thus, including it into the model seems to be an interesting extension, which is left for future research.
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and yearly consumption in the US and finds significant evidence for habit formation at all
levels of data. Winder and Palm (1996) confirm habit persistence in the Netherlands for
quarterly consumption. Braun et al. (1992) observe the effect of habits on consumption
in Japan. Carroll et al. (2000) show that habit formation can lead to a positive short-run
response of savings to a favorable shock, even when there is no long-run effect of such
a shock on savings. Fuhrer (2000) claims that the hypothesis of no habit formation can
be rejected with a high level of confidence because the habit formation model captures
the gradual hump-shaped response of real spendings. In a nutshell, habit formation finds
clear empirical support and is accounted for in many intertemporal consumption-savings
models (Alessie and Lusardi, 1997; Carroll, 2000; Brown et al., 2009).
Typically, the habit formation process is assumed to be linear, with the future level
of habit depending on the previously formed habit and previous consumption (Fehr and
Zych, 1998; Carroll, 2000; Brown et al., 2009). Linear habit formation has been supported
by (Sheeran, 2002; Ajzen, 2002), but is lately refuted by Lally et al. (2010), who instead
claim that habit changes in a non-linear way. Also, Hull (1943) studies how people
develop their habits while doing simple routines: exercising after breakfast and before
dinner. He shows that after several repetitions the habit grows asymptotically increasing
steadily, but by a smaller amount with each repetition. According to Chen and Ludvigson
(2009), nonlinear habit specifications are used in most of the recent research works (Li,
2001; Wachter, 2006; Yogo, 2008) as far as there is no theoretical reason to discard their
validity.
We consider the latest theoretical and empirical literature and assume that a subject’s
habit grows in a non-linear way with respect to the previous habit and consumption levels
(Lally et al., 2010). Following Carroll et al. (2000), Lally et al. (2010), Havranek et al.
(2017), we assume habit to increase at a decreasing speed (see Equation 5):3
Ht = σ × (λ × Ht−1 + (1-λ) × Ct−1
σ
)α, (1)
where Ct and Ht denote the levels of consumption and habit at time t, and λ, α, and σ
are parameters.
According to the literature, λ ranges from 0.1 (Fehr and Zych, 1998) to 0.7 (Brown
et al., 2009). We take an intermediate value of λ=0.5, assuming equal contribution of the
previous habit and consumption to the new habit value.4 Besides that, we make the habit
3 For the technical proof, see Appendix I.
4 There is no unique value for the initial level of habit. In Fehr and Zych (1998) it is 0, whereas in
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non-linear, growing exponentially (α=0.85). By doing so, we incorporate two important
properties of the habit formation function. First, we make it sluggish and imperfectly
updating to the changes in consumption (Carroll et al., 2000). Second, we preserve the
idea of saturation, assuming that the marginal effect of a rise in the standards of living
(habit) is decreasing (Tinbergen, 1960). Last but not the least, we set σ=66.67, which
plays the role of a scaling parameter responsible for the homogeneity of both - habit and
utility functions and does not influence our results in any other way.
3.2 The Utility Function
Bowman et al. (1999), Duesenberry et al. (1949), Shea (1995b), and Shea (1995a) find an
asymmetric response of consumption to anticipated changes in income. They state that
people resist decreasing their standards of living even when they foresee a decrease in
future earnings. According to Shea (1995b), people spend more when their future wages
are supposed to rise, but they do not cut back when their future wages are expected to
be cut. This is additional empirical evidence for consumption being "sticky downward"
due to two reasons: (1) loss aversion of individuals; (2) reflection effects. Both features
are captured in the utility function provided by Bowman et al. (1999), which is why we
use the latter model as a benchmark for our experiment.
U(Ht, Ct) =
α× Htσ + σ × (Ct−Htσ )α, Ct > Htα× Ht
σ
− β × σ × (Ht−Ct
σ
)α, Ct ≤ Ht
, (2)
where α and β are parameters for risk and loss aversion, respectively
According to the chosen functional form (see Equation 2), we expect individuals to be loss-
averse and more sensitive to the fall in consumption below the current level of habit than
to an equal rise above it (Bowman et al., 1999). Uneven responses to up and down moves
in consumption relative to habit resemble the value function proposed by Tversky and
Kahneman (1992). That is why we apply the same structural form of the utility function
as Bowman et al. (1999), but use parameter values from Prospect Theory. Because the
values of α and β differ across experimental studies (Camerer and Ho, 1994; Tversky and
Fox, 1995; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996), we choose the closest ones to the original values
proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992): α=0.85, β=2.
Brown et al. (2009) it is 10. We assume H0 being equal to 50.
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3.3 The Optimal Consumption Path
In addition to analyzing subjects’ behavior, we want to investigate how their choices differ
from the theoretically optimal ones. In the experiment, each subject knows in advance
that he will "live" for 15 periods. The first 10 periods correspond to the working career,
during which a subject earns an income of Yt per period. During the last 5 periods,
which correspond to retirement, a subject does not earn anything (Yt=0). We introduce
a borrowing constraint such that subjects cannot spend their future income on current
consumption - it can only be financed by savings and current income.5 Subjects maximize
their total utility over the lifetime with respect to consumption:6

f
max
C1,..,C15
(C1, H1, ..., C15, H15) =
15∑
t=1
U(Ct, Ht)
Ct ≤ Yt +
t−1∑
i=1
(Yi − Ci)
. (3)
Because in our theoretical model subjects make decisions sequentially at different points
in time, we are dealing with a multi-stage decision problem (see Equation (3)). This type
of optimization problems can be solved by using backward iteration and search (Ballinger
et al., 2011). Thus we use dynamic programming to find the optimal consumption path
by sub-optimizing consumption in reverse sequential order (Rao, 2009).7 We consider two
cases, distinguishing deterministic and stochastic income. In case the income is deter-
ministic, each subject receives Yt = 100 per working period. If the income is stochastic,
subjects know that they will get either Yt = 80, Yt = 100 or Yt = 120 with equal proba-
bility. This leads to two different optimal consumption paths, one for deterministic and
one for stochastic income (see Table 1).
To check the robustness of our results, we compare the utility from consuming optimally
with the utility received by subjects when following a "rule of thumb". Empirically, many
people follow simple rules ("heuristics") instead of solving an intertemporal optimization
problem. The main reason for that is their inability to apply backward induction to
find the optimal solution (Pemberton, 1993; Hey, 2005). Thus, heuristics or rules of
5 We make this assumption because subjects significantly under-consume when they have an option to
borrow (Meissner, 2016). As our main goal is to compare different pension schemes, we exclude an
option to borrow to avoid misidentification of what causes higher savings – a possibility to borrow or
the pension system design.
6 The utility function depends both on the levels of consumption (Ct) and habit (Ht). When
Ht(Ht−1;Ct−1) and H0 are known, we can express the utility function only through consumption.
7 The calculations were carried out using R.
109
Table 1: Optimal Consumption vs. Rules of Thumb
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Utility
Deterministic 53.75 55.68 58.91 59.75 61.25 63.75 64.67 66.75 66.75 69.75 70.25 75.68 73.18 75.25 84.50 84.25
Stochastic: I 54.50 55.50 57.50 58.50 62.26 61.50 65.50 64.25 64.25 64.25 77.50 74.50 75.50 79.50 85.00 79.41
Stochastic: II 50.50 53.19 59.50 60.50 61.26 62.50 65.50 70.50 70.50 69.50 71.50 72.50 73.50 75.50 84.00 84.00
Rule I 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 -197.34
Rule II 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 100 100 100 100 100 38.42
Rule III 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 160 160 160 160 160 15.88
thumb have been recognized as important approaches to decision-making (Camerer, 1995;
Conlisk, 1996; Rabin, 1998).
In our context, there are several heuristics discussed in the literature. According to Keynes
(2016) people tend to consume all their available income thus do not save anything for
retirement, whereas Lettau and Uhlig (1999) find that people tend to consume (only)
20% - 50% of their income. We look at three main rules: (1) consume all income at each
moment in time (Keynes, 2016); (2) consume 50% of income in every working period, and
dividing equally the savings for retirement (Campbell and Mankiw, 1989); (3) consume
20% of income in every working period, and dividing equally the savings for retirement
(Lettau and Uhlig, 1999). Table 1 illustrates the utility loss arising from following these
rules compared to following the optimal decision path.
4 Experimental Design and Procedures
The experiment was programmed in O-tree and conducted at WiSo Experimental Labo-
ratory in Hamburg in June - August 2018.8 Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were
randomly assigned to the computers and provided with necessary instructions. They could
ask clarification questions in person before the experiment started. There are 6 experi-
mental treatments (see Table 2), each of them consists of five main parts: (1) questions
to test cognitive abilities; (2) the BRET task; (3) questions to control for understanding
of the pension task; (4) the pension task; (5) the questionnaire.
The cognitive abilities of the participants were checked using the questions made as pro-
posed by Conway et al. (2005). To control for risk aversion, we used the incentivized
10x10 dynamic version of the BRET task (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013). Before running
the main part of the experiment, the pension task, we asked subjects multiple-choice
questions to control for their understanding of the main features of the game (the habit
formation process, the utility function, etc.). If subjects answered incorrectly, they were
8 You can find a demo version of the experiment at https://experiment-uni-li.herokuapp.com/demo/
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Table 2: Description of Treatments
Treatment Name Income (ECU) Pension
System
Pocket
Savings
Obligatory
Savings
Voluntary
Savings
1 S1Cons always 100 I +
2 S2Cons always 100 II + +
3 S3Cons always 100 II + + +
4 S1Stoch 80, 100 or 120 I +
5 S2Stoch 80, 100 or 120 II + +
6 S3Stoch 80, 100 or 120 III + + +
asked to rethink their answers.9 After finishing the pension task, subjects went through a
short questionnaire providing information about their age, gender, and educational back-
ground. When the experiment was over, subjects were paid for the participation. For
every box collected in the BRET task, a subject got 0.1 euros (in case there was no bomb),
and zero otherwise. Besides that, we multiplied by 10 the number of total points that the
subject earned in one of the rounds of the game.10 That was the corresponding payment
for the pension task.
The pension task was conducted twice to study learning effects. The task was modeled
in the form of a game that lasted for 15 periods. In each period people had to make a
decision regarding their consumption and savings. In the first 10 periods, they received
some income, whereas in the last 5 periods they lived only on their savings. The amount
of per period income as well as the way in which people could make savings depended
on the treatment of the experiment (see Table 2). In S1Cons, S2Cons, and S3Cons, the
income is constant and equal to 100, whereas in the other three treatments (S1Stoch,
S2Stoch, S3Stoch), it is either 100, 80 or 120 with equal probability.11 To make the final
results comparable, we randomly generated two income paths (Path I and Path II) before
the experiment was conducted. Some of the subjects were given Path I in the first and
Path II in the second round of the game, and vice versa for the others. This allows us to
analyze the behavior of subjects knowing that all of them have had the same realizations
of income across the experiment. We introduce different income streams to check whether
stochasticity of income influences subjects’ saving decisions (see Table 3).
9 We provided the subjects not only with the instructions (see Appendix II), but also with handout
material which included the habit formation and the utility tables (see Appendix III). Using these
tables, subjects could easily find the level of habit/utility corresponding to different (although not all)
values of consumption without making any calculations. Moreover, during the game, subjects were
allowed to use a calculator that was provided on the screen.
10 There were two rounds, we selected one randomly.
11 All the amounts were expressed in experimental currency units (ECU) to avoid any anchoring effects.
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Table 3: Dimensions of Comparison
Dimension Treatments
Stochasticity of Income S1Cons vs. S1Stoch / S2Cons vs. S2Stoch / S3Cons vs. S3Stoch
Different Pesion Systems S1Cons vs. S2Cons vs. S3Cons / S1Stoch vs. S2Stoch vs. S3Stoch
The second dimension of comparison is the type of pension system. The first pension
system has no particular mechanism that would oblige people to save. Everything that is
not spent on consumption becomes "pocket" savings, which can be used by the subjects
at any moment in time. In a pension system of the second type, people are obliged to save
10% of their income in every working period. The total obligatory saved amount cannot
be spent until Period 11, when the retirement phase starts. Besides obligatory savings,
people can still make additional pocket savings. The third pension system provides an
additional option: voluntary pension savings. The difference between voluntary pension
savings and pocket savings is that voluntary savings cannot be accessed before retirement.
Theoretically, the type of a saving option should not affect the total amount being saved.
However, we do expect differences in saving behavior across pension systems. Based on
the existing literature, we formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis I
Subjects consume significantly more than they should during their working lives, i.e., they
do not save enough for retirement. With repetition of the task, they learn to consume
significantly less.
Hypothesis II
People save better (significantly more) when they are supposed to do so than when there is
no obligatory contribution to be made. Also, the option to save voluntarily induces higher
total savings.
Hypothesis III
Subjects save more when their income is stochastic than when it is deterministic.
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Hypothesis IV
Subjects apply "rules of thumb" when making savings. The choice of rule depends on
whether the future income is known or unknown.
Hypothesis V
The overall performance of subjects depends not only on the treatment but also on their
cognitive abilities and risk aversion.
First, we expect that subjects will not save sufficiently for the retirement as it is observed
in the majority of the empirical and experimental studies. Also, we believe that the obli-
gation to make periodical contributions will increase subjects’ awareness of the necessity
to save. As a consequence, people will save "actively", thus will save more. Besides that,
we suppose that in treatments with stochastic income, subjects will have a higher incen-
tive to think about future risks. That is why they will make larger savings. The overall
performance will depend on personal characteristics, such as attitudes towards risk and
cognitive abilities. Due to the complexity of the task, we forecast people to use "rules of
thumb" that we expect to vary depending on the income path.
5 Results
We have conducted one session of each experimental treatment. The number of subjects
per treatment varies from 26 to 30 people.12 In total, 171 people took part in the exper-
iment. The average payoff was 11 Euro. There are more male than female participants
(see Table 4).13 Most of the subjects are quite young (not more than 30 years old) and
have a bachelor or master degree. The results of the BRET task show that subjects are
mainly risk-lovers: less than half of a sample (43%) are averse or neutral to risk. Only 3%
of subjects have at least some prior knowledge about the topic of the experiment. Most
of the people demonstrate good cognitive abilities: almost all (94%) answered more than
50% of logical questions correctly. Overall, based on the results of a Chi-squared test (see
12 It was planned to get 30 participants per treatment, however due to no "show-ups" the number of
participants is less than 30 for some of the treatments: S1Stoch, S3Cons - 26; S1Cons - 29; S2Cons,
S2Stoch, S3Stoch - 30
13 Background: No - "No, I have not attended any classes about either topic"; A bit - "Yes, I have
attended at least one class on saving decisions"; Some - "Yes, I have attended at least one class
on pension finance"; Sufficient - "Yes, I have attended classes on both pension finance and saving
decisions".
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Table 4), the data sample seems to be similarly distributed across treatments concerning
gender, risk-aversion, cognitive abilities, education and the professional background of
subjects.
Table 4: Data Sample Structure
Parameter Description Fraction Prob. chi2
Gender Female/Male 56% / 44% 0.80
Education High School/Bachelor/Master/PhD/Other 5% / 54% / 33% / 8% / 0% 0.47
Risk-Attitudes Averse/Neutral/Lover 37% / 6% / 57% 0.21
Age Below 20 / 20-25 / 25-30 / Above 30 3% / 60% / 26% / 11% 0.60
Cognitive Abilities Less than 4 answers / 4-8 / 8-16 0% / 6% / 94% 0.45
Background No /A bit / Some / Sufficient 87% / 10% / 1% / 2% 0.78
5.1 Consumption
The amount of savings is directly linked to how much a subject consumes during his
working life. Thus, we start the analysis by comparing the optimal and observed in the
lab consumption paths. On Figures 1, 2 and 3 we show the average level of consumption in
each period and the corresponding optimal amounts to be consumed. In all the treatments
subjects consume too much during their working lives, thus have to restrict themselves in
consumption during the retirement. The tendency to overconsume is not as pronounced
in Round II as in Round I, which means that people learn and adjust their consumption
choices towards the optimal ones.
Figure 1: Consumption in S1Cons S2Cons S3Cons (ECU)
Looking at the graphs, it is not easy to see whether in the first, second or third pension
system subjects overconsume least of all. Due to that, we have calculated the total amount
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Figure 2: Consumption in S1Stoch S2Stoch S3Stoch: Round I - Path I, Round II - Path
II (ECU)
Figure 3: Consumption in S1Stoch S2Stoch S3Stoch: Round I - Path II, Round II - Path
I (ECU)
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of consumption over the first 10 periods for each of the subjects and found the averages
across treatments (see Table 5). Besides that, for each of the treatments, we estimated
the standard deviation of consumption per working period. As you can see from Table 5,
in all treatments subjects consume more than they should, although in the third pension
system subjects consume least of all per period and in total.14 The variation in per period
consumption is the smallest for the first pension system when the income is constant, and
for the second, when it is stochastic.
Table 5: Consumption: averaged across two rounds (ECU)
Deterministic Income Stochastic Income
S1Cons S2Cons S3Cons Opt S1Stoch S2Stoch S3Stoch Opt
Total 702.21 708.95 626.87 621.00 753.60 749.73 670.82 615.73
Period St.Dev. 9.88 11.14 11.10 8.35 12.08 9.24 11.49 9.15
To support the conclusions made above, we provide the results of the Mann-Whitney test
in Table 6. We compare the amount of total consumption over the first 10 periods across
experimental rounds. Besides that, we analyze whether subjects consume significantly
more than they would following the optimal path.15
We support our previous conclusions and find that at 1% level of significance, subjects
consume more than they should in all pension systems except the third one. Subjects of
the first and second systems (except for S2Stoch) tend to adjust their behavior consuming
significantly less (at 5%) in the second than in the first round of the game. Overall, we
cannot reject the first hypothesis that subjects do not reach the optimal consumption path
because they overconsume during their working lives. Although, we can only partially
accept that over time people learn to consume significantly less.
Table 6: Statistical Tests: Total Consumption (p - values)
Deterministic Income Stochastic Income
Test Comparison S1Cons S2Cons S3Cons S1Stoch S2Stoch S3Stoch
Mann-Whitney U Real vs. Optimal 0.01 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.02
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank First vs. Second Round 0.01 0.04 0.79 0.00 0.27 0.86
Result I: People fail to consume optimally. They spend too much before retirement and
consequently do not have sufficient money for consumption after retirement. In some of
14 Consumption per working period can be estimated as total consumption from Table 5 divided by 10.
15 For the comparison of real and optimal paths, we use the consumption values averaged across two
rounds.
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the treatments, subjects tend to adjust their behavior consuming significantly less in the
second than in the first round of the game.
5.2 Savings
One of our key research questions is how the pension system design influences savings.
There are different ways to save for the retirement. The largest number of savings options
are available in the third pension system: pocket, obligatory and voluntary savings. Only
pocket and obligatory savings are possible in the second system, whereas in the first
system there are no saving mechanisms besides pocket savings. In the current section,
we investigate not only the total amount of savings but also in which ways it has been
accumulated.
From the graphs below you can see the average amount of total contributions (savings)
made in different experimental treatments.16 As you can see from Figure 4 and Figure 5,
the largest amount of total savings is made in the third pension system, whereas there is
no clear evidence that people save more in the second than in the first pension system.17
When income is deterministic, people save more in the first system, whereas when it is
stochastic, they accumulate more in the second pension system.
Figure 4: Savings Structure: S1Cons, S2Cons, S3Cons (ECU)
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Another important aspect of savings is their structure. In the first pension system, people
make only pocket savings. It is interesting to see whether in the second system subjects
16 The average amount of savings is calculated as the total amount of savings accumulated within the
first 10 periods averaged across two rounds of the game.
17 For the more detailed information, please see Appendix IV.
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Figure 5: Savings Structure: S1Stoch, S2Stoch, S3Stoch (ECU)
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make pocket savings as before plus obligatory savings, that is why save more in total.
In reality, subjects save almost the same total amount in both systems, reducing their
pocket savings in the second system by the amount they are obliged to save. Thus, the
introduction of an obligatory pension contribution does not stimulate subjects to save
more than otherwise. Whereas the introduction of an option to make voluntary savings
leads to higher total savings. As you can see from Figure 4 and Figure 5, the pocket savings
in system 3 are smaller than in system 2. However, in system 3 people save additionally
in the form of voluntary savings and the corresponding amount is much larger than a
decrease in pocket savings. Overall, the introduction of a voluntary pension contribution
stimulates subjects to save more in total than otherwise.
Table 7: Mann-Whitney U Test: Savings (p - values)
Deterministic Income Stochastic Income
S1 / S2 S2 / S3 S1 / S2 S2 / S3
Pocket 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.37
Pocket + Voluntary - 0.01 - 0.00
Total 0.73 0.01 0.57 0.00
Stated above conclusions are supported with the help of Mann-Whitney U test (see Table
7).18 We compare whether: (1) pocket savings; (2) pocket and voluntary savings; (3)
total savings differ across treatments. Independently of the income path, we do not find
any significant evidence that total savings in the first and the second treatments vary.
Subjects significantly reduce their pocket savings in the second system, making negligible
the contribution of obligatory savings to the total accumulated amount.
18 For Table 7 and Table 8 the total amount of savings is averaged across two rounds of the game.
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In the second and third systems, total savings vary significantly. The pocket savings are
larger in system 3 than in system 2 only when income is constant. However, independently
of the income path, the voluntary savings are big enough to make the total accumulated
amount higher for the third than for the second system. Overall, we have to partially reject
our second hypothesis: the option of voluntary savings motivates people to accumulate
more, whereas introduction of obligatory contributions does not seem to have a significant
effect on total savings.
Table 8: Mann-Whitney: Savings in Deterministic vs. Stochastic Treatments (p-values)
S1 S2 S3
Total Savings 0.53 0.11 0.27
Pocket Savings 0.53 0.11 0.86
Voluntary Savings - - 0.14
Besides that, we test whether savings in treatments with the stochastic income are sig-
nificantly higher than in corresponding treatments with fixed income. It is evident from
Table 8 that all three kinds of savings do not differ much across treatments. Thus, we can
reject our third hypothesis that people save more when their income is stochastic than
when it is deterministic.
Apart from the amount of savings and their structure, it is interesting to study the
patterns or "rules of thumb" that subjects apply when making decisions. Analyzing
saving patterns at the individual level, we conclude that in treatments with stochastic
and deterministic income people apply different "rules of thumb". Thus we cannot reject
our fourth hypothesis. In case the income is known, people tend to increase their savings
linearly with time. Whereas if the income is stochastic, subjects form their consumption
paths tracking the changes in income.
For each of the subjects who participated in treatments with the deterministic income,
we have checked whether the savings’ path is significantly different from linear. Then we
have calculated the percentage of subjects for whom this difference was not significant at
5% level. In this way, we have found how frequently subjects use a linear trend in savings
as a rule (see Table 9). Also, we have calculated the initial savings’ rate as well as the
marginal growth in savings.
As you can see from Table 9, at least 20% of subjects in each of the treatments use a
linear rule of thumb. Most often it is applied by the participants of S1Cons, whereas
least often it is used by players of S3Cons. Besides that, initial savings’ ratio, as well as
its growth, vary across treatments. Subjects of S1Cons treatment initially save only 50%
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Table 9: Trend in Savings: Deterministic Income
S1Cons S2Cons S3Cons
Frequency of Usage 52% 38% 20%
Initial Savings Ratio 50% 42% 71%
Marginal Growth Rate 48% 24% 18%
but raise it by 48% in every subsequent period. Whereas participants of S3Cons start
saving 71% of their initial income increasing the savings’ rate slowly with time (18%).
Overall, the average growth rate of savings is significantly different from zero.19 It means
that subjects from our sample do not apply the common rules described in the literature
(always to consume 100%, 50% or 20% of income). To conclude, the larger is the set
of available saving options, the less frequently people rely on the "rules of thumb". In
quantitative terms, the rules vary across systems. Making savings within the first pension
system, subjects start at a lower rate but grow savings faster than in the third system.
Interestingly, less than 5% of people who participated in treatments with the stochastic
income used a linear "rule of thumb", thus we do not report corresponding results in
here. However, participants in those treatments use another rule - they changed savings
mimicking the income moves. We have calculated how often changes in saving rates
correlated with ups or downs in income and reported corresponding results in Table 10.20
As you can see, most of the times subjects of S1Stoch and S2Stoch adjust their savings’
rates mimicking income moves. In the third pension system, people rely on this "rule of
thumb" least of all.
Table 10: Trend in Savings: Stochastic Income
S1Stoch S2Stoch S3Stoch
Frequency of Usage 0.61 0.69 0.14
Result II: People save significantly more in the third than in the second pension systems,
which is in large the result of considerably big voluntary contributions. We do not find
any evidence that obligatory contributions lead to higher total savings than in their ab-
sence. Also, stochasticity of income does not seem to change the amount of total savings
drastically. We find that subjects use "rules of thumb" when making savings decisions.
When they know their future income, they tend to increase savings linearly over time. In
case future income is unknown, subjects mimic its moves in their saving choices.
19 The significance is tested with the help of t-test at 5% level
20 All correlation coefficients are significant at 5% level.
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5.3 Total Points
In our experiment, the overall performance of a subject depends not only on the total
amount of consumption (savings) but also on pace at which it was accumulated over the
game. The ideas of consumption smoothing and habit formation are the key elements of
our model. We believe that saving 50 ECU every year over 10 years’ horizon is not the
same as to save 500 ECU at once. If the subject’s habits are decent, to make a saving
of 500 ECU, a subject has to consume way below his level of habit sharply reducing
consumption. Consequently, his final utility is lower than if he would get making savings
in smaller quantities but over a longer time horizon. In our game, the final payment to
a subject depends on the amount of "total points" (total utility) he gains, which is esti-
mated as the sum of all utilities over the lifetime. Thus, the number of total points reflects
not only consumption choices, but also their development through the entire game. That
is why we analyze the total number of points to understand which factors influence the
subject’s overall performance in the saving task. According to the literature, not only the
level of income and the structure of the pension system but also cognitive abilities and
risk-aversion of subjects influence their decisions. Thus we formulate our linear regression
model as follows:
Log_Total_Points_I(II) = α + β1 × I_Stoch+ β2 × II_Stoch+ β3 × II_Cons+
+ β4 × III_Stoch+ β5 × III_Cons+ β6 × Logic+ β7 × RA+ Cons (4)
, where Log_Total_Points_I(II) - the log of the number of total points collected by
the subject in I(II) round of the game; Logic - the level of cognitive abilities of a subject;
RA - equal to -1/0/1 if a subject is risk-averse, risk-neutral or risk-lover; Cons - constant;
I_Stoch - the dummy variable equal to 1 if a pension system is of the first type with the
stochastic income (the same logic holds for all other variables).
We try different specifications of the model and present corresponding results in Table
11 and Table 12.21 Using S1Cons as a base treatment, we want to see whether in other
treatments subjects earn significantly more total points. Independently of the round,
21 All regressions are checked for multicollinearity, misspecification, and omitted variables. None of that
is identified. There is heteroscedasticity, thus we report the results with robust standard errors.
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subjects earn 7% more in the stochastic than in the deterministic treatment of the first
pension system. Around 10% more get subjects of S2Stoch than subjects of S1Cons. The
largest difference in total points is observed for S3Cons treatment - subjects accumulate
around 11% more on average than in the base treatment. Cognitive abilities of subjects
significantly influence their overall performance in saving task: every question answered
correctly leads to a 2% increase in total points. Lastly, risk-aversion does not seem to
have any significant effect on subjects’ performance. Thus we can partially reject our fifth
hypothesis.
Result III: Subjects perform worst of all in the treatment with only pocket savings
option and constant income. In all other treatments, they get significantly more points
because of making more savings or (and) adjusting their amount evenly across time. The
largest difference in total points is observed for S3Cons treatment - subjects accumulate
on average around 11% more than in S1Cons. Better cognitive abilities of subjects lead
to better performance, whereas risk-aversion does not seem to have any effect.
Table 11: Total Points, Round I: Different Regression Specifications
(1) (2) (3)
Log_Total_Points_I Log_Total_Points_I Log_Total_Points_I
I_Stoch 0.065 0.073∗ 0.074∗
(0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
II_Stoch 0.103∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.109∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
II_Cons 0.156∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
III_Stoch -0.046 -0.037 -0.040
(0.100) (0.101) (0.108)
III_Cons 0.178∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
Logic 0.017∗ 0.017∗
(0.007) (0.007)
RA 0.006
(0.021)
Cons 6.832∗∗∗ 6.605∗∗∗ 6.606∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.104) (0.105)
N 225 225 225
R2 0.090 0.111 0.111
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 12: Log Total Points, Round II: Different Regression Specifications
(1) (2) (3)
Log_Total_Points_II Log_Total_Points_II Log_Total_Points_II
I_Stoch 0.065∗ 0.072∗ 0.068∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
II_Stoch 0.084∗∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.096∗∗
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
II_Cons 0.130∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
III_Stoch 0.078∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.095∗∗
(0.033) (0.031) (0.030)
III_Cons 0.141∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Logic 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
RA -0.016
(0.009)
Cons 6.920∗∗∗ 6.705∗∗∗ 6.703∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.058) (0.058)
N 225 225 225
R2 0.133 0.192 0.203
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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6 Conclusions
We study how different pension schemes, as well as stochasticity of income and personal
characteristics of subjects, influence their decisions to save for retirement. Our primary
goal is to find what kind of pension system structure makes subjects to save more. As a
theoretical benchmark, we provide a modified version of a standard additive consumption
model. After finding the optimal consumption paths, we test whether the behavior leading
to those optimal paths is observed in the experiment. Our overall conclusion is that people
consume far above the optimal level. Due to that, they do not save enough and experience
a severe fall in their utility during the retirement stage. Although in the second round of
the game the fall is not that tremendous: subject learn to reduce their consumption with
repetition of the task.
Besides that, we find that introduction of the obligatory saving option does not lead to
higher total savings - people reduce their pocket savings correspondingly to the amount
that is saved under obligation. Whereas in the system with the voluntary saving option
people save significantly more in total. The total savings do not differ significantly for
the treatments with stochastic and deterministic income. However, subjects use different
"rules of thumb" when income is known and unknown. When the income is determin-
istic, they tend to increase their savings linearly over time. However, when the income
is stochastic, subjects mimic its moves in their saving choices. Cognitive abilities signifi-
cantly affect the subject’s saving behavior.
Regarding policy implications, our research suggests that the introduction of a possibility
to make voluntary contributions makes subjects aware of the necessity to save actively for
the retirement. Thus, the policy-makers should pay more attention to this option although
tailor it to the specific features of the pension-system of each country. Besides that,
increasing the subject’s awareness of the necessity to save in advance seem to be helpful.
We show that with repetitions of the task, people learn to overconsume less. However, in
life repetitions are not feasible, which means that subjects should get aware as soon as
possible that their consumption choices now directly influence their consumption in the
future. In this respect, it is important to increase the level of financial literacy among
individuals such that their consumption decisions would not be careless and myopic.
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Appendix I
Ht = σ × (λ × Ht−1 + (1-λ) × Ct−1
σ
)α (5)
∂Ht+1
∂Ht
= σ × α × λ × (λ × Ht−1 + (1-λ) × Ct−1
σ
)α−1 (6)
∂2Ht+1
∂H2t
= σ × α × λ2 × (α− 1) × (λ × Ht−1 + (1-λ) × Ct−1
σ
)α−2 (7)
∂Ht+1
∂Ct
= σ × α × (1− λ) × (λ × Ht−1 + (1-λ) × Ct−1
σ
)α−1 (8)
∂2Ht+1
∂C2t
= σ × α × (α− 1) × (1− λ)2 × (λ × Ht−1 + (1-λ) × Ct−1
σ
)α−2 (9)
As far as σ > 0, 0 < α < 1, 0 < λ < 1, we have: ∂Ht+1
∂Ht
> 0, ∂Ht+1
∂Ct
> 0, whereas ∂
2Ht+1
∂H2t
< 0, ∂
2Ht+1
∂C2t
< 0. In other words, the habit formation function is increasing in habit and
consumption, but at a decreasing speed.
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Appendix II
This is the version of the instructions for the treatment S3Cons. For all other versions,
contact the authors.
Background and short summary
This experiment is about saving and consumption decisions. You will participate in a
game that will last for 15 periods. You will face 15 subsequent decision situations about
how much you want to spend on current consumption and how much you want to save
for the future.
Every time you spend money for consumption, you earn points. How many points you earn
in a period depends on two factors: (i) how much you money you spend on consumption
in that period and your current habit (both will be explained in detail later). At the
end of the experiment, all points that you have earned will be summed up, converted
into EUR and paid out in cash. Thus, it is in your interest to collect as many points as
possible.
Income
In the first 10 periods (your working life), you will receive some income which is denoted
in the experimental currency “Taler”. This income varies from period to period, and will
be either 80, 100 or 120 Taler. The sequence of incomes was generated by a random draw,
where each outcome was equally likely for each period. In Periods 11-15 (retirement),
your income will be 0.
Savings
There are three ways how to save money: the obligatory contribution, the voluntary
contribution and ordinary savings. During your working life (periods 1-10), 10% of your
income will be automatically deducted as an obligatory contribution to the pension
fund. This money will be blocked until period 11, from which on you can use it. Whatever
is left after the obligatory contribution can be fully used for consumption or can be saved
in two other ways:
• You can make a voluntary contribution amount of “X” to the pension fund. In this
case you also cannot use this saved amount until retirement.
• You can do nothing with the amount not used for consumption. In this case it is kept
on your account as savings “Y” . This money can be used at any period in the future.
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You can do neither, only one of them but also both, the voluntary contribution and the
ordinary savings.
Example:
Suppose your income is 100 Taler, the amount deducted for the obligatory contribution
will be 10 Taler (the 10%). You then have 90 Taler left for consumption or further savings.
If you decide to make a voluntary contribution of X Taler, it means that you could
consume 90-X today. Remember that you can use the X Taler only when you are on
retirement: in periods 11 - 15.
Now suppose you decide not to spend the full 90 - X Taler in that period, but Y Taler
less. Then these Y Taler will be automatically kept as savings on your account and can
be spent at any moment in the future.
Note: All of your savings and money left by the 15th period will automatically be spent
in this (last) period.
Points earned by consumption
The points you earn from consumption depend on the amount of Taler spend on con-
sumption and your current consumption habit.
Habit
Intuition of the consumption habit: during a lifetime a person develops a habit
of consumption depending on what he or she is used to spend.
For example, if you are a student, you might be willing to live in a small flat with little
comfort. When you grow older you improve the living standard and spend more on living.
In this example your consumption level has grown over time and so has your habit. Also
in this experiment the level of consumption you are currently used to will be called Habit.
We will assume that in Period 1, your first Habit is exogenously given and equal to 50
Taler, whereas in all subsequent periods it is defined by the consumption you made in
former periods. In Table 1 you can check what will be your Next_Period_Habit for a
specific amount of consumption and the current level of Habit.
In detail the habit of the next period in Table 1 is calculated as follows:
Next_Period_Habit = AF * (0.5 * Adj.Habit + 0.5 * Adj. Consumption)0.85
“AF” is a constant adjustment factor of 66.67; Adj. Habit is the Habit divided by this
factor AF and Adj. Consumption is the consumption divided by this factor.
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As you can see, the higher your current Consumption is, the larger becomes yourNext_Period_Habit.
Example:
If your Habit is 50 and your Consumption is 100, your Next_Period_Habit will be 74
Taler.
Whereas if your Habit is 50 and your Consumption is 30, your Next_Period_Habit will
be 43 Taler. Thus the more you consume, the higher is your Next_Period_Habit.
Remember, in Table 1 you can see how your habit will change for any level of consumption
you might choose.
Points earned:
You can check the number of points you will earn in a period for any level of consumption
and habit with Table 2.
In detail, the number of points (from table 2) that you will earn is defined by the following
formula:
Points = 100 ∗
0.85× Adj.Habit+ (Adj.Consumption− Adj.Habit)0.85, Ct > Ht0.85× Adj.Habit− 2× (Adj.Habit− Adj.Consumption)0.85, Ct 6 Ht (10)
Be aware that the more you consume now, the more you will need to consume in the
future to be as happy as you are currently. You do not need to calculate the points on
your own. A points calculator will be available for you anytime during the experiment.
Intuition behind: most probably you will agree that it is harder to switch back from a
luxury car to a cheap one than from a cheap one to a luxury one.
That is why, you receive less points if you consume below your current level of habit.
From the formula above, you can see that you lose twice as many points consuming below
as you gain consuming above your current level of habit.
Example:
If your Habit is 50 and you consume 100, you will get 142 points. Whereas if your Habit
is 50 and your Consumption is 30, you will get -8 points. Thus, consuming below the
habit causes you less or even negative number of points.
The decision screen:
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You will be provided with a decision screen (see below) in every single period of the game.
Once again, your task is to decide how much you want to save and how much you want
to consume. Remember that voluntary contributions as well as obligatory contributions
can be spent on consumption only after retirement.
Final Payoff
Your final payoff will be calculated as the total sum of all the points collected during the
game divided by 100. You will play two full implementations (sets of 15 periods) of this
experiment. Only one implementation will be paid. Which one is determined randomly.
Example:
If you got 1000 points in total, your final payoff will be 10 EUR.
The decision screen:
In each period a new line is added to the table. In this example you face the investing
decision in period 2. The columns can be described as follows:
Period: In which period you are. Here, in this example period 2.
Gross income: Your income in this period. Here 100.
Obligatory Pension Account: The sum of all obligatory payments. You can only use
this money for consumption from period 11 on when it will be transferred to Savings.
Voluntary Pension Account: The sum of all voluntary payments. You can only use
this money for consumption from period 11 on when it will be transferred to Savings.
Savings: The number of savings always available for you for consumption. Here 40.
Available Money: The sum of your income from this period and your savings. Here
90+40=130. In period 11 the obligatory and the voluntary pension account will be trans-
ferred to the savings account and therefore will also be available.
Consumption: The consumption of a period. Here it is “none” because you have not
decided yet on the consumption amount.
Habit: Your current habit which influences the points you earn with your consumption.
Here 52.
Points: The number of points earned. Here “none” because you haven‘t consumed yet in
this period.
Total Points: The sum of all points earned in the experiment after the specific period.
Here “none” because you have not earned points in this period yet.
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Appendix IV
Table 13: Savings’ Structure (ECU)
Deterministic Income Stochastic Income
S1Cons S2Cons S3Cons S1Stoch S2Stoch S3Stoch
Total Savings: 238.76 243.33 391.81 197.73 241.73 346.50
"Pocket" Savings 238.76 143.33 108.58 197.73 141.73 125.20
Obligatory Savings - 100.00 100.00 - 100.00 100.00
Voluntary Contribution - - 183.23 - - 121.30
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